Neural correlates of mindfulness : investigating self-related processes in mindfulness meditators using functional magnetic resonance imaging by Lutz, Jacqueline
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Neural correlates of mindfulness : investigating self-related processes in
mindfulness meditators using functional magnetic resonance imaging
Lutz, Jacqueline
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-127149
Originally published at:
Lutz, Jacqueline. Neural correlates of mindfulness : investigating self-related processes in mindfulness
meditators using functional magnetic resonance imaging. 2016, University of Zurich, Faculty of Arts.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF MINDFULNESS
Investigating self-related processes in mindfulness
meditators using functional magnetic resonance
imaging
Thesis (cumulative thesis)
Presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
of the University of Zurich
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
JACQUELINE LUTZ
of Zurich, Switzerland
Accepted in the Autumn Term 2015
on the Recommendation of the Doctoral Committee:
Prof. Dr. Lutz Jäncke (main advisor)
Prof. Dr. Uwe Herwig
Prof. Dr. Boris Quednow
Zurich, 2016

“All of man’s difficulties
are caused by his inability
to sit, quietly, in a room
by himself.”
Blaise Pascal, 1623-1662
“I was going to change my shirt,
but I changed my mind instead.”
Winnie the Pooh
(Alan Alexander, 1882-1956)

Acknowledgments
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the many people who inspired and
supported me and this work.
Prof. Lutz Jäncke for supervising this thesis. His broad neuroscientific knowl-
edge and inspiring viewpoints were of great value on my academic journey. Prof.
Uwe Herwig, for the opportunity to work in his neuroimaging group and the
chance to follow my scientific interests while also gaining invaluable clinical expe-
rience. Prof. Boris Quednow, for his support and acceptance to co-examine this
dissertation.
My co-workers, Prof. Annette Brühl and Hanne Scheerer, for fruitful discussions
during all stages of this thesis. Andrea Weibel and the neuroimaging group for
generously assisting me during data acquisition. Philipp Stämpfli, for his support
and MR expertise.
I would like to thank Prof. Richard Davidson and his team for the opportunity
to stay at the Center for Investigating Healthy Minds at the University of Madison,
Wisconsin during my studies. It was an invaluable research and learning experience,
for which I am deeply grateful.
A special thank you to all participants, meditators, and to Samuel Theiler
and other meditation teachers who supported me finding participants – this thesis
wouldn’t have been possible without their help.
Thanks to my fellow doctoral students and all my dear friends and family
for their emotional support during this time – and for the one or other mindless
conversation to balance things out!
Last, but not least, I am grateful for my mother’s enduring support and
optimism.
Wim, thank you for everything! Celebrating this thesis and all the fortune we
had together means a lot to me.
iii

Contents
Acknowledgments iii
Abbreviations vii
Summary ix
Zusammenfassung xi
1 Introduction 1
2 Theoretical background 3
2.1 Mindfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1 Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.2 Mindfulness research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Mechanisms of change in meditators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 Self-related functions and the brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Self-related functions and mental health . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.3 Mindful perspectives on self-related functions . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.4 Emotion regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Methods 11
3.1 Study samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Experimental designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Functional magnetic imaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4 Analysing fMRI data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5 Trait mindfulness questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 Aims and research questions 15
5 Empirical studies 17
Study 1: Neural correlates of mindful self-awareness in mindfulness medi-
tators and meditation-naïve subjects revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Study 2: Altered processing of self-related emotional stimuli in mindfulness
meditators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
v
CONTENTS
6 Discussion 57
6.1 Main findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.4 Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Appendix A Sample characteristics 80
Appendix B Supplementary material study 1 86
Appendix C Supplementary material study 2 89
Curriculum Vitae 93
vi
Abbreviations
B Baseline
BA Brodman area
CMS Cortical mid-line structures
DLPFC Dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex
DMN Default mode network
DMPFC Dorso-medial prefrontal cortex
DMN Default mode network
BOLD Blood oxygen level dependent signal
EMO Self-related emotional conditions
FEEL Mindful self-awareness (body and emotions)
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging
FWE Family-wise error correction
FFMQ Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire
FSL Software for the analysis brain imaging data
GLM General linear model
LTM Mid-to-long-term meditators
MBSR Mindfulness-based stress reduction
MBCT Mindfuness-based cognitive therapy
MNP Meditation-naïve participants
MPFC Medial prefrontal cortex
MWT-B Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test
NNSC Negative not self-critical
NT Neutral
OM Open monitoring meditation
PANAS Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
PCC Posterior cingulate cortex
PFC Prefrontal cortex
pre-SMA Anterior portion of the supplementary motor area
vii
ABBREVIATIONS
R Software environment for statistical analysis and graphics
ROI Region of interest
SC Self-criticism
SCS Self-Compassion Scale
SDS Zung Self-rating Depression Scale
SP Self-praise
TAS Toronto Alexithymia Scale
THINK Cognitive self-reference (thinking about the self)
PPI Psycho-physiological interaction
VMPFC Ventro-medial prefrontal cortex
viii
Summary
Mindfulness – a non-judgmental focus on present-moment experiences – is increas-
ingly integrated into western therapy programs to alleviate mental health related
problems (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Mindfulness can be trained through meditation,
and is thought to involve changes in self-related functions such as increased body
awareness and decreased attachment to the self (Hölzel et al., 2011). In other
words, mindfulness meditators practice “experiencing the self” instead of engaging
in thoughts and judgements about the self. This is hypothesized to reduce problems
associated with an exacerbated self-focus and brooding on negative aspects of the
self, while increasing emotional balance, for example in the face of self-criticism
(Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). Despite the clinical relevance of such changes, neu-
roscientific investigations of self-related processes in mindfulness meditators are
scarce (Tang et al., 2015), particularly regarding their neural correlates. This
thesis describes two experiments on self-related functions and emotions during
functional magnetic imaging (fMRI). In both experiments, the subjects consisted
of 22 experienced, regular mindfulness meditators (LTM) and 22 meditation-naïve
participants (MNP).
The first study compared mindful awareness of body and emotions (“experiencing
the self”) to cognitive self-reference (“thinking about the self”). Mindful awareness
has been associated with activations in somatosensory brain regions and reduced
activations in cortical mid-line structures in novice meditators (Farb et al., 2013),
and partly in untrained individuals (Herwig et al., 2010). Here we investigated
this contrast in regular mindfulness meditators and compared them to untrained
individuals.
During mindful self-awareness we found increased activation in somatosensory
areas in both groups, consistent with Herwig et al. (2010). Decreases in regions
associated with cognitive self-reference were also found in both groups, however
they were larger in LTM. Interestingly, neural activations during mindful awareness
indicated that LTM engaged less in verbalizing their experience compared to MNP.
Overall, these results corroborate the link between meditation training and neural
correlates of mindful self-awareness (Farb et al., 2013). However, group differences
were less pronounced than previously suggested, indicating that states of mindful
awareness are accessible to untrained individuals.
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SUMMARY
The second study employed individually tailored stimuli of self-praise and self-
criticism to investigate self-related emotion processing in meditators. Activations
in emotion-generative structures (such as the amygdala) and emotion-regulative
structures in the prefrontal cortex have been found during self-criticism (Doerig
et al., 2014). We hypothesised to see group differences in these regions and in
affective ratings after self-appraisals.
When comparing affective ratings after self-criticism and self-praise, LTM showed
a smaller difference between these conditions than MNP. On the neural level,
however, the group comparison revealed that LTM had stronger activations in
emotion-generative regions during self-appraisals, indicating higher emotional re-
activity (Taylor et al., 2011). LTM further displayed stronger activations in the
dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). The DMPFC activation correlated with
a non-reacting attitude towards inner experience, as assessed in a trait mindfulness
questionnaire. This could reflect that meditators face self-appraisals in an accept-
ing and non-reactive way (Hölzel et al., 2007). Further, the DMPFC activation
in LTM showed no difference in functional connectivity to other regions during
self-appraisals compared to neutral stimuli, while in MNP increased connectivity
between DMPFC and posterior mid-line and parietal regions was found. Thus,
meditators might have processed self-related emotions with less self-focused atten-
tion than MNP (Garrison et al., 2014).
In summary, cortical prefrontal mid-line structures were less active in medita-
tors during mindful self-awareness, while a partly overlapping DMPFC region
was stronger activated during self-criticism and self-praise. The cross-sectional
design of our studies limits direct causal conclusions, but the results point towards
meditation-training related improvements in present-moment awareness, and a
more accepting attitude when facing self-appraisals.
x
Zusammenfassung
Achtsamkeit wird in vielen, vor allem östlichen Traditionen beschrieben, und be-
zeichnet eine nicht-wertende Aufmerksamkeit auf Erfahrungen im Moment, z.B.
Körperempfindungen, Gedanken und Gefühle (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Eine achtsame
Haltung kann unter anderem mittels Meditation geübt werden. Achtsamkeitstrai-
ning wird auch vermehrt in der Psychotherapie eingesetzt. Positive Effekte von
Achtsamkeit gehen wahrscheinlich mit Veränderungen in selbst-bezogenen Prozes-
sen einher (Hölzel et al., 2011). Meditierende üben zum Beispiel, sich selbst im
Moment wahrzunehmen, ohne sich in Gedanken und Urteilen zu diesem Selbst
zu verlieren. Dies kann negativen selbstbezogenen Prozessen entgegenwirken, wie
zum Beispiel einem zu starken Fokus auf das Selbst, dem Grübeln über negative
Aspekte des Selbst und übertrieben starken selbstbezogenen Emotionen (z.B. starke
Selbstkritik) (Vago and Silbersweig, 2012).
Trotz der klinischen Relevanz solcher Vorgänge, z.B. im Bezug auf die Depressi-
onsbehandlung, gibt es bisher nur wenige Studien, die Veränderungen in selbst-
bezogenen Prozessen in Achtsamkeits-Meditierenden zu erfassen versuchen. Die
vorliegende Dissertation untersucht selbstbezogene Prozesse und ihre neuronalen
Korrelate, mittels funktioneller Magnetresonanz Bildgebung (fMRI), in 22 erfah-
renen Achtsamkeits-Meditierenden (LTM) und vergleicht sie mit einer Gruppe
Meditations-Unerfahrener (MNP).
In der ersten Studie untersuchten wir, in welchem Ausmass die achtsame Wahrneh-
mung von Körper und Gefühlen (“Fühlen”) im Vergleich zum Nachdenken über sich
selbst (“Denken”) zu vermehrter Aktivierung in sensorischen Körperwahrnehmungs-
Arealen und reduzierter Aktivierung in gedanklich, selbst-bezogenen Mittellinien-
Arealen führt. Diese Muster zeigten sich nach kurzem Achtsamkeitstraining (Farb
et al., 2013), und zum Teil bereits in Meditations-Unerfahrenen (Herwig et al.,
2010). Jedoch hat noch keine Studie diese Befunde in erfahrenen Meditierenden
überprüft.
In unserer Studie führte “Fühlen” zu Aktivierungen in Körperwahrnehmungs-
Arealen in beiden Gruppen. Reduzierte Aktivierung in frontalen Mittellinien-
Strukturen waren hingegen ausgeprägter in LTM, was darauf hinweist, dass diese
Gruppe weniger selbstbezogene Bewertungen während “Fühlen” machte. Ausser-
dem deuteten reduzierte Aktivierungen in sprachbezogenen Arealen darauf hin,
xi
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dass LTM ihre Erfahrungen während “Fühlen” weniger stark verbalisierten. Die
Ergebnisse legen Fortschritte in achtsamer Wahrnehmung aufgrund von Achtsam-
keitstraining nahe. Jedoch zeigten auch MNP einige dieser Aktivierungen. Es scheint
also, dass kurze Phasen achtsamer Wahrnehmung auch für Untrainierte zugänglich
sind.
In der zweiten Studie untersuchten wir die Verarbeitung von Selbstkritik und
Selbstlob. Meditierende trainieren eine akzeptierende Haltung gegenüber Emotio-
nen. Deshalb erwarteten wir Unterschiede in Emotionsgenerierenden Strukturen
(z.B. der Amygdala) aber auch in präfrontalen, Emotionsregulierenden Strukturen.
Ausserdem erfragten wir die Stimmung nach Selbstlob und Selbstkritik.
Meditierende berichteten weniger emotionale Auslenkung nach Selbstlob und Selbst-
kritik. Auf der neuronalen Ebene hingegen, zeigten Meditierende stärkere Aktivie-
rungen in Emotionsgenerierenden Strukturen, vor allem während Selbstlob. Dies
deutet auf stärkeres emotionales Erleben in dieser Gruppe hin. Wir fanden aus-
serdem stärkere Aktivierungen im dorso-medialen präfrontalen Kortex (DMPFC).
Diese Aktivierung korrelierte mit einer nicht-reagierenden Haltung gegenüber Er-
fahrungen (eine Facette des erhobenen Achtsamkeits-Fragebogens) und könnte
eine akzeptierende Haltung gegenüber Selbstlob und Selbstkritik bedeuten. Eine
funktionelle Konnektivitäts-Analyse während selbstbezogener Emotionsprozesse
zeigte, dass in MNP die DMPFC-Aktivierung stärker mit Aktivierungen in an-
deren Mittellinien- und parietalen Strukturen verbunden war. Dieselbe Analyse
zeigte keine Unterschiede in der funktionellen Konnektivität in LTM. Dies könnte
bedeuten, dass Meditierende die selbstkritischen und selbstlobenden Adjektive mit
weniger selbstbezogener Aufmerksamkeit verarbeiteten als Meditations-Unerfahrene
(Garrison et al., 2014).
Zusammenfassend fanden wir reduzierte Aktivierungen in präfrontalen Mittellinien-
Strukturen in Meditierenden während achtsamer Selbstwahrnehmung. Hingegen
fanden wir in einer teilweise überlappenden DMPFC Region verstärkte Aktivierung
während Selbstkritik und Selbstlob. Diese Resultate widerspiegeln wahrscheinlich
eine “erfolgreichere” achtsame Wahrnehmung von Körper und Gefühlen im Moment,
und eine akzeptierende Verarbeitung selbstbezogener Emotionen.
Trotz der Einschränkung solcher Querschnittsstudien im Bezug auf kausale Rück-
schlüsse, geben die hier vorgestellten Studien weitere Hinweise auf Veränderungen
in selbstbezogenen Prozessen im Zusammenhang mit Meditationstraining.
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Eastern meditation and mindfulness techniques have found their way from monaster-
ies into western mainstream. Particularly the last 30 years have seen a rising interest
in these techniques, mainly driven from western clinical psychology. Mindfulness
promotes a non-judgmental focus on present-moment experience, and has been
associated with improved mental health and well being, by alleviating stress and
fostering emotional balance. With these promises in mind, numerous mindfulness-
based clinical programs have been developed.
Roughly in the same period, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has
allowed an unprecedented view into human brain activity. Research into the effects
of mindfulness training thus increasingly investigated neural underpinnings of asso-
ciated behavioral changes. Based on these results, several integrative theoretical
frameworks have been established to explain the salutary effects of mindfulness.
Most of these propose mechanisms of change associated with changes in self-related
processes and emotion regulation, such as less attachment and a non-judgmental
attitude towards the self, and increased present-moment awareness. But the exact
mechanisms are still poorly understood, particularly on the neural level, and litera-
ture on this topic is still sparse.
This thesis aims to advance our understanding of mindfulness-related changes
in self-related processes. It is built around two studies on self-reference, body
awareness and self-related emotions in experienced mindfulness meditators, and is
structured as follows: Chapter 2 lays the theoretical ground, by defining mindfulness
and introducing self-related processes and emotion regulation. The concepts are
integrated on a theoretical level and regarding their neural correlates. Further,
previous findings on changes in self-referential processes related to mindfulness are
discussed. The methods chapter (3) describes the samples and methods employed
in the studies conducted as part of this thesis. Chapter 4 states the aims of the
two studies. The studies and results follow in the empirical chapter (5). Chapter
6 concludes the thesis with a summary of the results, an integration into the
theoretical framework, and a discussion of limitations and future directions.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical background
This chapter introduces the concept of mindfulness, how it is related to meditation
and how it can be studied. Further, meditation-related neurobiological changes
regarding the self and emotion regulation are discussed. These changes are explored
in the light of current research – particularly in the field of neuroscience – and
discussed regarding their clinical relevance.
2.1 Mindfulness
2.1.1 Concept
The Eastern roots of mindfulness date back about 2500 years to the term Sati
in the ancient Indian language Pali (Pali Text Society, 1921). It describes the
faculty of a present mind, which can be cultivated by means of meditation train-
ing (Silananda and Heinze, 1995). Several forms of meditation exist to cultivate
mindfulness, including open monitoring (OM) techniques (Lutz et al., 2008), which
involve nonreactive monitoring of body states and the contents of the mind itself.
Meditation ultimately has the goal of reducing suffering (Mikulas, 2007; Silananda
and Heinze, 1995), an interest, which is shared by western psychology.
Increasingly, mindfulness techniques have been integrated into modern psychothera-
peutical programs (Baer, 2003). John Kabat-Zinn, founder of the first mindfulness-
based interventions, such as mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), coined
the mindfulness definition “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the
present-moment, and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Bishop et al. (2004)
propose a similar definition, consisting of the two components attention to momen-
tary experiences and an accepting attitude towards these experiences. However,
there is disagreement whether mindfulness in its western adaptations reflects all
important aspects originally indicated by Sati (Chiesa, 2012; Christopher et al.,
2009; Grossman and Van Dam, 2011; Shapiro et al., 2006). Moreover, mindfulness
has been introduced as a psychological construct independent of Eastern influences
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(Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000). Further complexity for defining mindfulness stems
from the fact that it can simultaneously be used to describe a particular state of
mind, a trait, reflecting a persons natural tendency to be mindful in everyday life,
or a meditation technique (Davidson, 2010; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). In short,
definitions of mindfulness remain controversial both among Buddhist scholars and
mindfulness researchers (Hart et al., 2013).
Despite the lack of a unified definition, mindfulness has been associated with a
wide range of positive effects on mental health, such as lower levels of stress, and
psychopathological symptoms, better self-regulation, emotional balance and general
well-being, both in healthy individuals and clinical populations (Baer, 2003; Hart
et al., 2013; Keng et al., 2011). The size of these effects varies across meta-studies.
Some find that effects might not be superior to other active treatments (Goyal
et al., 2014; Khoury et al., 2013) and specific causal links between mindfulness and
these effects have rarely been established so far (Chiesa and Serretti, 2010; Eberth
and Sedlmeier, 2012; Gu et al., 2015). The current state of mindfulness research
partly reflects the still relatively young research field and the multi-facetted nature
of mindfulness.
2.1.2 Mindfulness research
Mindfulness as a state has mainly been explored in meditators during meditation
(for an overview see Cahn and Polich, 2006), but some studies have also looked into
short phases of mindful states in meditation-naïve subjects (Herwig et al., 2010;
Lutz et al., 2014; Farb et al., 2007).
At the same time, mindfulness training increases trait mindfulness (Kiken et al.,
2015). Thus, beyond improving mental capabilities for meditation, mindfulness
training is assumed to influence mental functions in everyday life. In the language
of neuroscience, the repeated mental activity of meditation is believed to cause
enduring structural and functional changes in the brain (Davidson and Lutz, 2008;
Luders et al., 2009; Fox et al., 2014), similar to other, well-documented accounts
of practice induced plasticity (Bezzola et al., 2012; Jäncke, 2013). To study such
changes, longitudinal and cross-sectional strategies are employed. Longitudinal
studies measure the same participants of mindfulness programs or meditation
retreats over time, while cross-sectional studies compare experienced meditators
with meditation-naïve participants at one time-point. Only longitudinal studies can
reach causal statements about mindfulness-related changes (Davidson, 2010), but
they require extensive resources. Furthermore, later stages of mindfulness training
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are hard to capture with longitudinal studies, since it would require to follow
meditators over long periods (Tang et al., 2015). Therefore, cross-sectional studies,
despite lacking the prospect of causal conclusions, remain a valuable strategy to
gain first evidence for changes related to mindfulness training or for studying later
stages of mindfulness training.
2.2 Mechanisms of change in meditators
Related to the multifaceted nature of mindfulness, different mechanisms of change
have been proposed. A widely referred theoretical framework by Hölzel et al. (2011)
describes a set of interrelated components of enhanced self-regulation along with
their neurobiological correlates. These are: increased attention and body awareness,
better emotion regulation and a change in the perspective on the self (see Figure
2.1). A newer description by Tang et al. (2015) subsumes the self-related functions
(body awareness and perspective on the self). Another neurobiologically informed
model even describes mechanisms of change purely from the perspective of changes
in self-related functions (Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). But what are self-related
functions, and how does mindfulness training relate to them?
2.2.1 Self-related functions and the brain
The self has fascinated mankind throughout its history. Philosophers and psycholo-
gists discussed its nature and described different forms of self-functions (Damasio,
2000; James, 1890; Neisser, 1988). Most theories distinguish between some form of
body-centered, “minimal” self and cognitive, conceptual self-defining functions. In
simple words, the former relates to experiencing our self in the present moment,
while the latter subsumes the concepts and thoughts we have about this self. These
two aspects have also been studied with neuroscientific methods (Gallagher, 2000).
In this thesis, the term experiential self will be employed for the former and cogni-
tive self for the latter. Self-reference describes processes related to the cognitive
self, while self-related functions subsume all processes related to the self.
On the neuro-anatomical level, the experiential self has been associated with ar-
eas related to sensory processing and body awareness, such as the insula and
somatosensory cortex (Bauer et al., 2014; Craig, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004), and
multisensory integration regions, like the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The
TPJ has been associated with consciousness, embodiment and agency (Blanke and
Mohr, 2005; Ionta et al., 2014).
5
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Neural regions associated with the cognitive self have mostly been identified in
fMRI studies, which utilize stimuli, such as trait adjectives, and let participants
judge, whether the stimulus describes themselves, versus someone else (Northoff
et al., 2006). Another approach is to present participants with previously chosen,
self-describing stimuli (Doerig et al., 2014). Some studies use no external stimuli,
but instruct participants to initiate specific self-related processes, like thinking
about the self (Brühl et al., 2014; Herwig et al., 2010). Results of these studies relate
the cognitive self to cortical mid-line structures (CMS), including the dorso-medial
prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), posterior
cingulum (PCC) and precuneus (Farb et al., 2007; Herwig et al., 2010; Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004). Posterior parts of the CMS have been linked to autobiographical
memory, the DMPFC to judgement about the self, and the VMPFC and other
rostro-medial prefrontal regions to affective self-reference (Schmitz and Johnson,
2006). Together, these CMS structures have been suggested to constitute the core
of our conscious, cognitive self (Northoff et al., 2006).
Another line of research studies the brain “at rest”, i.e. when participants are not
conducting a specific task. A set of regions, which display coherent neural activa-
tions during such a resting state, have been described as the default mode network
(DMN) of the brain (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Interestingly,
these regions strongly overlap with the activations observed in self-referential tasks
(Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011), indicating that self-reflection might constitute a
“psychological baseline” (Northoff et al., 2006) of the brain in absence of a task.
However, the exact nature and implication of the DMN is still debated (Callard
and Margulies, 2014).
In summary, self-related regions in the brain are commonly described as structures
subserving body awareness and interoception, such as the insula, somatosensory
cortex, and TPJ, and structures involved in higher order, cognitive self-reference,
such as frontal and parietal CMS.
2.2.2 Self-related functions and mental health
Disfunctional self-referential processes have been associated with various mental
disorders. Depression, for example, is characterized by a stronger self-focus and self-
criticism (Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 1986; Joormann and Gotlib, 2010; Mor and
Winquist, 2002; Northoff, 2007) and increased rumination about negative aspects of
the self (i.e. brooding) (Disner et al., 2011; Hamilton et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008). On the neural level, research suggests that such symptoms are at
least partly reflected in functional changes in the CMS. During self-referential tasks,
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depressed patients showed increased activation in the VMPFC (Lemogne et al.,
2012; Northoff, 2007). Similarly, during resting state, depression was associated
with hyper-activation and hyper-connectivity in the DMN (for an overview see
Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012).
2.2.3 Mindful perspectives on self-related functions
Mindfulness training might influence self-related functions through increased body
awareness and a changed perspective on the nature of the self.
Focused attention on body sensations, such as the breath, is part of many medita-
tion techniques, including OM. Attention on body sensations is believed to increase
body awareness in meditators. Structural changes in the insula and other sensory
cortices in meditators might reflect this mechanism (Fox et al., 2014). However,
direct behavioral evidence for increased body awareness in meditators, for example
as assessed in classical heart-beat detection tasks, is still scarce (Khalsa et al.,
2008). Two recent studies found evidence for increased body awareness in the form
of better tactile-discrimination (Fox et al., 2012) or more accurate detection of
physiological changes related to emotions (Sze et al., 2010).
Awareness of the body can be seen as the opposite of rumination. Body sensa-
tions always take place in the present moment, thus they can act as an anchor
to (re-)direct the attention to the present moment. In this way, meditation might
impede an exaggerated cognitive self-focus or being caught up in thoughts about
the past or future (Brewer et al., 2011), which has been associated with negative
mood (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010).
Direct neuroscientific research on mindful self-awareness and self-reference in medi-
tators is scarce. An often-cited study by Farb et al. (2007) compared participants
after an MBSR course to subjects without mindfulness training. Both groups
performed experiential self-awareness compared to cognitive self-reference vis-a-vis
general trait adjective stimuli. The study found increased activations in MBSR
participants in regions associated with body awareness (insula, somatosensory
cortex), while activations in CMS regions and the amygdala were reduced. This
is in line with the illustrated polarity between present-moment awareness and
cognitive self-reference. The reduced amygdala activation even indicates reduced
emotional arousal during experiential self-awareness in meditation trained subjects.
However, an experiment on mindful awareness in a sample of meditation-naïve
participants, which used no stimuli, also reported decreased CMS and amygdala,
and increased insular and somatosensory activations (Herwig et al., 2010). Thus,
a state of mindful awareness might already induce a shift away from habitual
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self-reference in untrained individuals.
Another way in which mindfulness might promote healthy self-related processes,
is related to the Buddhist view of the self as a transient entity (Fulton, 2010).
Particularly during OM meditation, meditators observe the contents of the mind
itself. The arising thoughts and feelings should be met in a non-judgmental and
non-reactive way. Such an observer’s view – sometimes called meta-awareness
– weakens the identification of the observer with her thoughts and feelings, and
challenges the concept of a static self over time. This change in the perspective
of the self should reduce identification and attachment to the self. Brown et al.
(2007) speak of a “quieting of self-concept”. This mechanism seems harder to grasp
and most likely requires extensive mindfulness training. At the same time it has
several interesting implications for mental health.
On the one hand, it could reduce the aforementioned symptoms associated with
a strong self-focus. On the other hand, if emotions and thoughts are perceived
as simple mental phenomena, their relevance and emotional impact should be
reduced (Fulton, 2010). Hence, emotional reactions towards self-related emotions
such as self-criticism should be diminished (more in section 2.2.4). Such more
profound changes in the perspective on the self have not been extensively studied
in mindfulness research. Some qualitative and questionnaire studies report changes
in the perspective on the self in meditators, resulting in higher self-acceptance and
more self-esteem (Hölzel et al., 2011; Kerr et al., 2011). Neuroscientific accounts of
such changes are scarce, but have found evidence for changes in mid-line regions
(Hölzel et al., 2011). Studies on brain networks during meditation showed decreased
DMN activations, and higher connectivity between the DMN and regions implied in
cognitive control (Brewer et al., 2011). But these results might not reflect enduring
changes in self-related processing beyond meditative states. Evidence for lasting
changes of self-processing is provided by a classic resting state study in meditators,
i.e. when meditators were not meditating (Jang et al., 2011), which found changes
in the DMN similar to the ones described by Brewer et al. (2011). Thus, habitual
self-processing might indeed change as a result of repeated mindfulness training.
Finally, the reported decreases in DMN in Farb et al. (2007)’s study could be
mentioned in this context. However, the study focused on aspects of body aware-
ness rather than differences during cognitive self-reference. To our knowledge, no
neuroscientific study looked at active cognitive self-reference in meditators. Thus,
we have very limited knowledge of neural correlates of these processes in meditators
(Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2015).
In summary, there is some evidence that mindfulness training changes neural corre-
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lates of self-related processes (Brewer et al., 2011; Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang et al.,
2015), by increasing body awareness and present-moment focus, reducing cognitive
self-reference and potentially weakening self-attachment. Some of these mechanisms
are further closely related to emotion regulation, which will be discussed in the
following section.
2.2.4 Emotion regulation
Similar to mindfulness, the interest in emotion regulation has risen, as lower emo-
tional reactivity and better emotion regulation skills are related to mental health
(Gross and Muñoz, 1995).
Emotions are triggered by personally relevant, internal or external stimuli. These
stimuli attract an individual’s attention and are appraised regarding their value
and importance for the individual (Gross and Thompson, 2007). This emotion-
generative process leads to an emotional response, like fear, anger or joy, and can
be influenced consciously or unconsciously at different stages. Commonly described
adaptive strategies to regulate emotions include attention-deployment, i.e direct-
ing attention towards or away from an emotional stimulus, and reappraisal, i.e.
re-interpreting the stimulus in a more neutral way (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner
and Gross, 2005). On the neural level, emotion regulation is ascribed to prefrontal
regulatory structures (DMPFC, DLPFC), which exert a top-down influence on
emotion-generative, bottom-up regions, encompassing the amygdala, hippocampus
and striatum (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Phillips et al., 2003).
Mindfulness has been suggested to improve emotion regulation via attentional
control, body awareness and more successful reappraisal. Directing attention on
and verbal labeling of emotions (affect labeling) seems to already reduce amygdala
activation (Lieberman et al., 2007) in meditation-naïve participants. And higher
trait mindfulness was associated with increased top-down control during an affect
labeling task, indicating greater emotion regulation skills in more mindful individu-
als (Creswell et al., 2007). Further, increased awareness of body sensations and
emotions could help to become aware of emotions earlier in the emotion-generative
process. Emotion regulation strategies could then be applied at an earlier stage
and reduce affective responses more efficiently. The increases in attentional control
in meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007), has further been related to general
gains in cognitive functions like working memory (Chambers et al., 2007). Such
gains might free prefrontal resources for applying emotion regulation strategies
such as reappraisal more effectively (Davis and Hayes, 2011). Indeed, increased
prefrontal top-down activity when reappraising emotional stimuli was documented
9
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in subjects with higher trait mindfulness scores (Modinos et al., 2010).
However, regulating or changing emotions seems contrary to mindful attitudes
of non-judgmental awareness, non-reactivity, and acceptance. In an attempt to
reconcile the concepts, it has been suggested that meditators don’t reappraise
the emotions but the emotion-generative process itself, by observing it from a
meta-cognitive perspective. Another interesting suggestion by Chiesa et al. (2013)
and Zeidan (2015) places effects of short-term mindfulness practice closer to im-
provements in classic emotion regulation, reflected in increased top-down regulation
of emotions (e.g. increased reappraisal). In contrast, later stages of mindfulness
training might be characterized by reduced top-down regulation in the face of
emotional stimuli (Taylor et al., 2011), reflecting the non-judgmental and accepting
aspects of mindfulness.
Overall, better emotion regulation skills are probably related to increased atten-
tional and cognitive resources and heightened body awareness in meditators. The
accepting attitude towards experiences seems to contradict classical notions of emo-
tion regulation, but might present an additional mechanism in which experienced
meditators influence the emotion-generative process. Figure 2.1 summarizes the
discussed mechanisms of change in meditators and their neural correlates.
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Figure 2.1: Neural correlates of mindfulness-related changes in self-related functions
and emotion regulation. Adapted from Hölzel et al. (2011).
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This chapter introduces the study samples, experiments, methods and analyses
techniques used in the two empirical studies.
3.1 Study samples
Vipassana meditation or related open monitoring (OM) techniques (Lutz et al.,
2008) have particularly been linked to better emotion regulation and have greatly
inspired secular, clinical programs (Chiesa and Malinowski, 2011). Marked changes
in the perspective on the self and habitual emotion processing are likely to occur
at later stages of meditation training (Hölzel et al., 2011). For these reasons, we
recruited experienced mindfulness meditators, with OM experience (Lutz et al.,
2008). Minimal inclusion criteria were: more than one year experience in meditation
with a minimum of one year in the Vipassana tradition; a current meditation practice
in an OM technique (at least one hour per week); and retreat experience in the
Vipassana tradition.
The final sample consisted of 22 meditators with an average of 4862 lifetime practice
hours in Vipassana (range: 281-18325), and an average of 5971 hours when counting
total meditation experience (range: 506-18805). The current sample was therefore
well above the level of introductory mindfulness courses. There is no standardized
way to classify meditators regarding their experience. Following Zeidan (2015)’s
classification, the sample consists of 16 adept meditators (<1000 hours), and six
expert meditators (around or above 1000 hours). The sample is thus in the range of
meditators studied in cross-sectional investigations, such as Hölzel et al. (2007) or
Taylor et al. (2011). However, as opposed to cross-sectional studies by Brefczynski-
Lewis et al. (2007), Lutz et al. (2009) and others, our sample did not include very
high expertise levels >20000 hours.
Mindfulness meditators were matched with 22 meditation-naïve participants for age,
gender, years of education, highest educational degree, general field of occupation,
and crystalline intelligence.
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Both experiments in this thesis were carried out on these two samples. The samples
are characterized in more detail in chapter 5.
3.2 Experimental designs
Experiment 1 is based on an established paradigm by Herwig et al. (2010). Two
different self-related processes were explored in a slow event-related design: a
mindfulness-related awareness of body sensations and feelings in the present moment
and cognitive self-reference (thinking about the self). In contrast to most studies on
self-related functions, the paradigm refrains from using external stimuli, in order to
resemble every-day self-related thoughts and perceptions and maximize ecological
validity. Further, we believe this setup is easier to follow by mindfulness-untrained
individuals, since the focus can remain purely on the self-related task.
Experiment 2 employed an innovative approach by Doerig et al. (2014) to study
self-related emotions. The authors used participant’s previously chosen, and thus
relevant, self-critical adjectives as stimuli. Here, the paradigm was extended to
include self-praising words. This would allow inference on valence-overarching
effects and offer first insights into positive self-appraisals in meditators.
Both experiments were extended with self-report affective ratings. This way, fMRI
data could potentially be supplemented with phenomenological insights regarding
subjective experience related to self-reference and self-related emotions. Moreover,
it would allow to explore potential behavioral differences between the groups.
3.3 Functional magnetic imaging
Functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) is a widely used, non-invasive method in
neuroscience to make inferences about brain activity (Logothetis, 2008). FMRI is
based on detecting changes in relative levels of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood.
The assumption is that active brain regions consume more energy, which triggers a
hemodynamic response and increases oxygenated blood flow to that region. This
relative increase in oxygenated blood can be detected by the MRI scanner, since the
paramagnetic property of oxygenated blood increases the magnetic signal (Jäncke,
2013). The blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal is thus an indirect
measure of brain activity. Although the exact relation between brain activation
and the BOLD signal is still under investigation, evidence suggests that the signal
corresponds to neural input and local processing in a region (Logothetis et al., 2001).
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3.4 Analysing fMRI data
Statistical inferences on brain activation can be gained with a general linear model
(GLM) approach. The observed time-series in a small brain volume (voxel) are
predicted by task-regressors in a mass univariate approach, i.e. for each voxel
separately. Regression weights can then be subjected to standard statistical tests
(e.g. t-tests), to compare different conditions and groups. Results of these analyses
are usually displayed in parametric maps, showing the fit between the experimental
manipulation and the observed voxel activation. A higher fit between a specific
brain region and a task regressor indicates that activity in a region was higher
during this condition. Thus, such an approach provides insight into the functional
specialization of a region.
Recently, the study of dynamic interactions between different regions has been
gaining more interest (O’Reilly et al., 2012) and a number of methods have been
developed to study them. Some measure effective connectivity, by assuming under-
lying connectivity models. They allow causal inferences about brain interactions,
which is close to the intuitive notion of functional connections between regions
(Friston, 1994). One method for measuring effective connectivity is the psycho-
physiological interaction analysis (PPI). It was introduced by Friston et al. (1997),
and is well suited for task-based connectivity analysis, as it is based on the GLM
approach (Poline and Brett, 2012). By adding the activation time-series from a
region of interest in the brain (seed) to the GLM, a PPI regressor can be constructed
to model the interaction between this seed and other regions in the brain depending
on the task. In other words, the PPI identifies areas in the brain which are more
strongly related to that seed during a specific task compared to another.
In this thesis, fMRI data are mainly analyzed by computing task- and group-
contrasts to localize relevant brain areas. In study 2, an activation result is further
explored in a PPI analysis, to study differences in functional connectivity between
brain regions during self-appraisals compared to neutral words, and to explore
differences in connectivity between groups.
3.5 Trait mindfulness questionnaire
The Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006), was devel-
oped based on five mindfulness questionnaires, using a factor analytic approach.
It consists of 39 items, rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale, which describe five
separable facets of mindfulness: 1) observing and, 2) describing experiences, 3)
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acting with awareness, and applying a 4) non-judgmental and 5) non-reactive
attitude towards inner experiences. The first three aspects relate mostly to aspects
of attention and body awareness while factors four and five are related to emotion
regulation in Hölzel et al. (2011)’s framework. The basic factor structure has been
validated (Christopher et al., 2012), however, some limits regarding the compa-
rability between meditators and non-meditators are discussed. The two studies
presented in this thesis utilize the FFMQ as a self-report trait mindfulness measure,
mainly for the possibility to examine group differences in light of specific aspects
of mindfulness (Baer et al., 2006).
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The goal of the present work is to help answer the question: “Can states of mindful-
ness and mindfulness training influence the way an individual processes self-related
information?”. As discussed in the previous chapters, the empirical basis in this area
is sparse. It relies on few samples of meditators and is often limited to participants
of introductory mindfulness courses. Thus, accounts of changes in self-related
processes are largely based on mindfulness theory or self-report data. Nevertheless,
mindfulness interventions have been integrated into many clinical programs partly
because healthier self-related functions are assumed.
The present work attempts to expand our knowledge on changes in self-related
processing associated with mindfulness on the neural level. During fMRI, different
self-related processes, like awareness of body and feelings, self-referential thinking
and processing of self-related emotional stimuli were investigated in the same sample
of mid-to-long-term meditators (LTM) and meditation-naïve participants (MNP). In
addition, behavioral data like facets of trait mindfulness, affective ratings during the
tasks, and meditation experience were employed to further explore group differences.
In study 1, states of mindful awareness of body sensation and feelings (FEEL) were
contrasted with thinking about the self (THINK).
Previous findings with this paradigm reported increased activations in somatosen-
sory regions and left inferior-lateral prefrontal cortex and decreased activation in
ventral prefrontal and posterior cortical mid-line structures (CMS) and the amyg-
dala (Herwig et al., 2010), indicating increased focus on sensations and reduced
cognitive self-reference according to the framework by Hölzel et al. (2011).
The primary goal of the present study was to investigate, in which of these areas
mindfulness meditators would differ in a direct group comparison. Based on findings
by Farb et al. (2007), greater decreases in CMS, left prefrontal and amygdalar
regions were expected in LTM during FEEL compared to THINK.
A second goal was to address contradictory results regarding mindfulness-related
brain activations in meditation-naïve participants during mindful awareness. Herwig
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et al. (2010) reported increased somatosensory activations and reduced amygdala
and prefrontal CMS areas in mindfulness-naïve, while Farb et al. (2007) mainly
reported such findings for meditators. The experimental setup in Herwig et al.
(2010) and the current study employed no external stimuli presumably facilitating
meditation-naïve participants to enter a mindful state. Thus, some of the discussed
mindfulness-related activations and deactivation were hypothesized also in MNP,
in particular, increased activations in somatosensory regions.
Study 2 investigated behavioral and neural correlates of individualized self-criticism
(SC) and self-praise (SP). Previous findings with a similar paradigm reported
increased amygdala activation during SC along with activations in prefrontal self-
referential and emotion regulative areas (DMPFC, DLPFC) in healthy subjects
(Doerig et al., 2014). According to the theoretical framework by Hölzel et al. (2011),
less emotional reactivity to these stimuli was hypothesized in meditators.
Behaviorally, we expected less extreme affective ratings in LTM after blocks of
SC and SP. On the neural level, decreased activation in emotion processing ar-
eas (e.g. extended amygdala) were assumed, along with differences in prefrontal
self-referential and emotion regulative areas. This hypothesis was formulated
non-directionally, given the conflicting theories regarding emotion regulation and
mindfulness (Chiesa et al., 2013), which is reflected in inconsistent findings regard-
ing prefrontal activations in meditators (compare section 2.2.4).
Further, group differences in functional connectivity between prefrontal activations
and other regions were explored during self-appraisals. Potential targets for this
task-dependent connectivity analysis were hypothesized in other prefrontal or CMS
and/or emotion-generative structures.
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Abstract
Mindful self-awareness is at the heart of mindfulness meditation practices and is thought
to play a key role in its salutary effects. Compared to cognitive self-reference, mindful
self-awareness has been related to decreased activation in cortical mid-line structures
(CMS) and the amygdala, and increased activation in somatosensory regions particularly
after mindfulness interventions. To what extent these patterns are already present in
untrained individuals is not completely clear and no study has verified these findings in
experienced mindfulness meditators.
Using fMRI, we investigated experienced mindfulness meditators (LTM, n = 21) and
matched meditation-naïve participants (MNP, n = 19) during short periods of mindful
self-awareness (FEEL) and self-referential thinking (THINK). Participants further rated
affective states after these periods.
We report somatosensory activations and decreases in CMS regions during FEEL for
both groups, with a significantly stronger decrease in prefrontal CMS in LTM. LTM
further showed decreases in left prefrontal and amygdala regions, but the latter was not
significantly different between groups. Groups did not report differential affective states
after FEEL or THINK. Our results demonstrate neural patterns of mindful self-awareness
in untrained individuals, which get more pronounced in mindfulness meditators.
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Introduction
Mindfulness meditation and clinical mindfulness programs teach a non-judgmental present-
moment awareness towards experiences, in particular towards sensations, feelings, and
thoughts (Baer et al., 2006; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Mindful awareness of such self-related pro-
cesses can be contrasted with cognitive self-related functions, which create self-knowledge
and a coherent sense of self over time (Gallagher, 2000). Indeed, most theories of different
aspects of the self distinguish a present-moment, experiential self from cognitive, self-
defining functions (Damasio, 2000; James, 1890; Neisser, 1988; Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004).
These forms of self-related processes are also relevant for clinical psychology. Research
suggests that a strong cognitive self-focus might be related to pathological forms of
self-reference, like increased negative mood (Mor and Winquist, 2002), rumination
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and depressive symptoms
(Northoff, 2007). In contrast, present-moment self-awareness has been linked to more
adaptive self-processing and less rumination (Baer, 2009; Jain et al., 2007), thus illustrat-
ing a fundamental mechanism through which mindfulness training could exert its salutary
effects on mental health (Gu et al., 2015).
On the neurobiological level, cognitive self-reference has been linked to brain activations in
cortical mid-line structures (CMS) (Farb et al., 2007; Herwig et al., 2010; Northoff et al.,
2006), and aberrant activity in these regions were related to depression in self-referential
tasks (Lemogne et al., 2012) and during rest (Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012). There
is evidence that mindfulness training changes neural correlates of self-referential processes
(Brewer et al., 2011; Hölzel et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2015), however it is
built on few studies (Tang et al., 2015). One study found that mindfulness training in
the form of a 8 week mindfulness-based stress reduction program (MBSR) lead to altered
neural processes during self-reference. MBSR participants showed reliably different neural
activations between mindful self-awareness of general trait adjectives (experiential self)
compared to cognitive self-evaluation of the same stimuli (narrative self), namely a shift
away from CMS towards right sensory cortex activations during the experiential compared
to the narrative self-focus (Farb et al., 2007). In meditation-naïve subjects, such a shift
was less pronounced and Farb et al. (2007) concluded that subjects without mindfulness
training probably did not enter a mindful self-awareness reliably different from cognitive
self-reference.
Our group reported more differences between mindful self-awareness (here called FEEL)
and cognitive self-related thoughts (here called THINK) in participants without mind-
fulness training (Herwig et al., 2010). The design did not involve stimuli and employed
shorter blocks, in order to facilitate mindful self-aware states. Results revealed reduced
activations during FEEL compared to THINK in the pre-frontal CMS (BA 9) and the
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amygdala region, along with activations in somatosensory areas. All these effects were only
reliably reported after MBSR training by Farb et al. (2007). Other divergent findings for
mindful self-awareness compared to cognitive self-reference between in meditation-naïve
participants were: Increased (Farb et al., 2007) versus decreased (Herwig et al., 2010)
activation in the left DLPFC, and regions only reported in one study (activation in right
DLPFC: Farb et al. 2007, activation in DMPFC: Herwig et al. 2010).
Convergent results were reported for rostral MPFC and PCC clusters. See Appendix B,
Table B.2 for an overview of the most important findings per region.
To resolve these partial contradictions about how mindful self-awareness is processed in
the brain without mindfulness training, a replication of the aforementioned findings in
meditation-naïve subjects is warranted. The practice related changes in these networks
are reported for participants of an MBSR course. Studying mindful self-awareness in
more experienced mindfulness meditators would allow to verify the reported practice
related changes in these networks after an MBSR course. To our knowledge, no study has
looked at differential neural activations of these two self-modes in longer-term, regular
mindfulness meditators.
The current study therefore aimed to validate the extend to which meditation-naïve
subjects show differential neural correlates between FEEL and THINK and to directly
compare their activations to mid-to-long-term meditators. To this end, we used an
adapted version of Herwig et al.’s experiment, and analyzed whole-brain activations
in meditation-naïve participants and mid-to-long-term meditators. Most importantly,
we directly compared whole-brain analysis between groups to reach conclusions about
statistically significant group differences. Based on previous findings, we hypothesized
decreased activation in CMS and amygdala, and increased sensory cortex and posterior
insula activation in both groups during the FEEL condition, while we also expected to
find differences between the groups in these regions and the left prefrontal cortex.
Materials and methods
Subjects We recruited 22 mid-to-long-term meditation practitioners (LTM, ages: 28-
67, Mean = 47, SD = 11.11, 10 female). LTM had at least 3 years of meditation
experience with a minimum of 1 year in Vipassana, a current practice of at least 1 hour
per week and retreat experience in Vipassana (minimum duration 3 days). The group
had an average of 4862 lifetime practice hours in Vipassana or related open monitoring
meditation practices (Lutz et al., 2008).
We matched LTM with 22 nearly or completely meditation-naïve participants (MNP,
ages: 29-64, Mean = 45.45, SD = 10.94, 8 female) for age, gender, years of education,
highest degree, general field of occupation, and a short German version of an intelligence
test (Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest, Lehrl 1977). Meditation experience was
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assessed in a structured self-report screening, for full disclosure of meditation experience
in both groups see Appendix A, Sample characteristics.
All subjects were right-handed according to a handedness questionnaire (Annett, 1970),
with no prior or current neurological or psychiatric illnesses (self-report). Further exclusion
criteria were intake of medication (except for oral contraceptives), psychotropic drugs,
regular consumption of alcohol >6 units/week, cigarettes >0.5 pack/day and general
contraindications against MRI examinations. The study was approved by the ethics
committee of the canton of Zurich and conducted in compliance with the Declaration
of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 1992). All participants gave written informed
consent and received financial compensation.
Subjects with more than 1.5 mm of head movement in one direction were excluded from
further analysis, resulting in 40 subjects (LTM=21, MNP=19). For an overview of the
analyzed sample’s sociodemographic data see Table 5.1. The analyzed sample still fulfilled
our matching criteria.
Table 5.1: Sociodemographic variables of subjects included in fMRI analysis.
MNP (n = 19) LTM (n = 21) LTM >MNP
M SD M SD Statistic (df) p
Age 45.32 10.67 47.05 11.39 t(38) =-.49 .62
Gender (f/m) 9/10 8/13 χ2(1) = .07 .79
Education (years) 18.21 3.91 18.94 4.56 t(38) =-.52 .61
IQ (MWT-B) 122.32 13.59 118.48 13.44 t(38) = .90 .38
Abbreviations MWT-B Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test Version B
Image acquisition Scanning was performed at the University Hospital of Psychiatry
(Zurich, Switzerland) using a 3-T Philips Intera whole-body MR unit equipped with an
Philips SENSE head coil. For each participant, 370 echo-planar whole-brain images were
acquired (repetition-time (TR)/echo-time (TE): 2000/25 ms, 30 sequential axial slices,
slice thickness: 3.0 mm, gap 1.1 mm, field of view (FOV): 240x240 mm, matrix 80x80
voxel, resulting voxel size: 3x3x3 mm, SENSE-factor: 2.0). The first four scans were
discarded due to T2 saturation effects. Further, we acquired a T1-weighted high-resolution
image (TR/TE 6.73/3.1 ms; voxel size 1x1x1 mm, 145 slices, axial orientation).
Questionnaires Within a week before scanning, participants completed a set of
questionnaires via online investigation tool (Unipark, QuestBack).
Of particular interest for this study were trait mindfulness assessed by the Five Facets
Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006, German version: Translation by Ströhle
et al., 2010, KIMS-D-Items, 2010; Michalak et al., 2008), and depressive symptoms
assessed by the Zung Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS, Zung, 1965, German version:
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Zung, 2005). Further, we assessed the ability to identify and describe emotions with
the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS, Taylor et al., 1985, German version, Bach et al.,
1996) and participant’s sociodemographics, and experience with meditation and related
techniques.
Before scanning we assessed participant’s affective state by administering the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule PANAS (Watson et al., 1988, German version Krohne et al.,
1996). After scanning, participants were asked about general experience during scanning,
how successfully they thought they completed the task and whether they experienced the
FEEL condition mostly verbally (i.e. labeling their experience) or non-verbally (simply
experiencing). Answers were given on a 9-point Likert scale.
fMRI experiment The paradigm is based on an established paradigm from our group
(Herwig et al., 2010) on different modes of self-reference. Conditions were 12 s of cognitive
self-reflection (THINK) or mindful self-awareness (FEEL), displayed in pseudo-randomised
order, and interspersed with blocks of REST. Participants were instructed to: “think about
yourself, reflect who you are, what you do, like, etc.” (for the THINK-condition) or “Feel
into yourself, simply be aware of body sensations and/or emotions in this moment” (for the
FEEL-condition) and during REST “do nothing specific, just await the rating/distractor”.
Simple visual symbols s t indicated the respective task, and were followed by either an
affective rating or a distractor task (Figure 5.1 A).
Affective ratings were acquired to gain insight into subjective experience during the task
and potentially reveal group differences. Participants indicated how they felt on a discrete
scale with the Self-Assessment Mannikins as 5 anker points (Bradley and Lang, 1994).
The scale was coded in steps of 1, ranging from -250 (= Mannikin very unhappy) to
250 (=Mannikin very happy) with 0 for neutral (Figure 5.1 B). Ratings had to be given
within a maximal time window of 6 s, using a track ball (Current Designs, Philadelphia,
USA). To ensure participants would not mis-identify the affective rating as the main
goal of the study, they were instructed to spontaneously answer the question “How do
you feel in this moment?” but focus on the THINK and FEEL task. As we wanted to
prevent participants from potentially entering a permanent meta-aware state by giving
affective ratings, we pseudo-randomly alternated affective ratings with a simple distractor
matching task, where participants had to click on a presented Mannikin.
A randomly jittered baseline period (1-3 s, mean 2 s) separated the trials. There
were twelve trials per condition in a single run. Total scan time was 12 min 20 s.
Subjects completed a short training run before scanning. The task was programmed
with PresentationTM, Neurobehavioral Systems, USA and presented via digital goggles
(Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA, USA).
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Figure 5.1: A) Schematic representation of a trial sequence including times of
presentation. B) close up of the discrete affective rating scale with Mannikin’s as
anker points. Values corresponding to the Mannikin’s are indicated but were not
visible to the participants.
Image pre-processing and analysis We used the FSL software toolbox (FMRIB’s
Software Library, Smith et al., 2004) for preprocessing and statistical analysis of the
imaging data.
Preprocessing of the functional data included motion correction (MCFLIRT, Jenkinson
et al., 2002), non-brain removal (BET, Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing (full-width half-
maximum) with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm, grand-mean intensity normalisation (FILM
prewhitening, Woolrich et al., 2001) and highpass temporal filtering (cutoff period 100 s).
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Pre-processed functional images were spatially registered to each subject’s skull-stripped
high-resolution anatomical image using a boundary-based registration algorithm (BBR,
Greve and Fischl, 2009). Normalisation of the high resolution structural image to the
standard space (Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)-152 template) was carried out
using linear registration with 6 degrees of freedom (FLIRT, Jenkinson and Smith, 2001,
Jenkinson et al., 2002) and further refined using FNIRT nonlinear registration with 12
degrees of freedom (Andersson et al., 2007).
Whole-brain analysis was conducted using the standard general linear model (GLM)
approach, implemented in FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 6.00.
On the subject level, a fixed-effect model included task regressors (THINK, FEEL) and
their temporal derivatives, convolved with a canonical double-gamma hemodynamic
response function. Extended movement regressors were entered as nuisance regressors (6
motion parameters including their derivatives (+6) and the squares of the parameters
and derivatives (+12)). Affective rating and distractor task periods (modeled as boxcars
with reaction time of the trial as duration) were entered as regressors of no interest.
Z (Gaussianised t) statistic images were calculated for THINK and FEEL against implicit
Baseline (B) and for the direct comparison FEEL>THINK (and THINK>FEEL). Implicit
baseline consisted mainly of the 12 REST blocks.
Group-level analysis was carried out using a mixed-effects model implemented in FLAME
(FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects, Beckmann et al. 2003, Woolrich et al. 2004,
Woolrich 2008). In a single model, we computed mean activations and deactivations in
MNP, mean activations and deactivations in LTM, and the contrasts between the groups
(MNP>LTM and LTM>MNP, respectively). The resulting whole-brain statistic images
were thresholded and FWE-corrected using clusters determined by z > 2.3 and a cluster
significance threshold of p < 0.05 (based on Gaussian Random Field Theory) (Worsley,
2001). To inquire the influence of meditation training, we exploratively added regressors
for total life-time meditation hours and a measure of practice intensity, as described by
Fox et al. (2012) to the LTM GLM model. To comprehensively compare our results with
inconsistencies in previous studies by Herwig et al. (2010) and Farb et al. (2007), we
additionally created independent ROI for the left amygdala and DLPFC, right secondary
somatosensory cortex (SII) and posterior insula (see Appendix B, Figure B.1). Results
are only reported qualitatively (Appendix B, Table B.3).
Analysis of affective ratings Behavioral analysis is based on the 40 included
subjects. Three subjects missed one rating.
Affective ratings were correlated on the subject level (ICC1 72.73%, calculated using the
multilevel package (Bliese, 2013)), thus the nested data structure had to be taken into
account. We formulated a linear mixed model to explain the relation between rating and
the fixed effects group (MNP, LTM) and condition (FEEL (reference level), REST and
THINK). We determined the random effects structure by comparing model fits between
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random intercept per subject and random intercept random slope for condition per subject.
Adding the random slope significantly improved model fit compared to the intercept only
model (χ2(5) = 33.22, p < .001). Adding an interaction for group with condition did not
improve model fit (χ2(2) = 0.38, p = .83).
Analysis of the final model was conducted in RStudio (Integrated development environment
for R, RStudio, 2012), using the lme4 library (Bates et al., 2014) with the bootstrap
method for calculating 95% confidence intervals.
Results
Questionnaire results and task success Groups only differed in two of the five
facets of mindfulness as measured with the FFMQ: LTM scored significantly higher for
observe (t(38) = 2.09, p = .047) and non-react (t(38) = 2.76, p = .0093). Further they did
not differ in their ability to report feelings (TAS) or in their level of depressiveness (SDS)
(Appendix A, Table A.6).
Mean level of depressiveness was 30.45 (range : 22− 51), and corresponded to the normal
range (20-44) except for one subject in the LTM group who scored 51, which corresponds
to the mildly depressed range. This subject in the LTM group did not report a depressive
phase but had stopped smoking recently. Analyses were computed with and without this
subject, which did not change the results.
SDS and FFMQ had good internal consistency in our full sample (0.89 for total FFMQ
and 0.82 for SDS). Both groups reported similar levels of positive and negative affect
before scanning. After scanning, they indicated similar levels of comfort during the scan
as well as perceived task success and easiness to get in or out of the two conditions
(Appendix B, Table B.1). LTM however reported significantly less verbal labeling during
the FEEL condition (Difference >1 point on a 9-point Likert scale, t(37)=2.26, p=.030).
Affective rating Mean mood rating during the scan across all subjects and conditions
was 128.95, which represents an overall slightly positive mood on our Self-Assessment
Mannikin’s scale.
In the linear mixed effect model, condition did not significantly predict affect: Compared
to FEEL (b = 126.15, 95% CI [92.53, 159.93]), neither THINK (b = 131.5524, 95%
CI [101.68, 161.85]) nor REST (b = 129.4651, 95% CI [95.89, 159.87]) lead to different
affective ratings. Further, group did not predict overall affective ratings (b = 0.76, 95%
CI [−41.74, 43.62]) (Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2: Affective ratings after the conditions FEEL, REST, and THINK.
Boxplots and underlying data are visualized for meditation-naïve participants
(MNP) and meditators (LTM) using ggplot 2 (Wickham, 2009). Lower and upper
“hinges” correspond to the first and third quartiles, whiskers extend to 1.5× the
inter-quartile range.
Whole-brain results during self-related processing Single group results for
FEEL>THINK are displayed in Figure 5.3: In both groups, we found significantly reduced
CMS activations in prefrontal regions (BA 10), the anterior cingulum (BA 25) and occipital
regions covering parts of the precuneus/PCC (BA 23/31) and cuneus (BA 18). Activation
clusters present in both groups were found in bilateral parietal regions (supramarginal
gyrus/secondary somatosensory cortex), and a more anterior part of the precuneus (BA
7). Only LTM displayed significantly lower activation the left inferior prefrontal area
including Broca’s area, and in bilateral hippocampus/amygdala and caudate regions.
Furthermore, significant activations in the bilateral posterior insula, posterior DMPFC
(pre-supplementary motor area (SMA)) and right DLPFC were only found in LTM during
FEEL>THINK.
As we found no group difference during the THINK condition (Table 5.3), we could
directly compare the groups in this contrast. Direct comparison revealed that CMS
reductions were significantly larger in LTM and that the reduction in the left inferior
prefrontal area (only found in LTM) was also significantly different from MNP on the
group level (Table 5.2, and Figure 5.4).
Note that the other discussed regions which were significantly deactivated in LTM only
(amygdala, caudate) or significantly activated in LTM only (insula, right DLPFC), were
not significantly different in the group comparison.
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Although there was no group difference in the THINK condition, we wanted to confirm
these results in the FEEL>B contrast. We found similar reduced activations in posterior
CMS regions in both groups. Again, the group comparisons resulted in significantly
higher prefrontal CMS activations, and higher activation in left-sided inferior frontal areas
corresponding to Broca’s area in MNP compared to LTM (Table 5.3). Also, we found
reduced activation in amygdala/hippocampus and activations in insular regions for LTM
only, but again they did not result in significant differences in the direct group comparison.
In the FEEL>B contrast, MNP showed reduced activation in the right DLPFC, which was
significant in the direct group comparison (Appendix B, Figure B.2). The LTM results
did not show a relation with meditation experience. The explorative independent ROI
analysis confirmed our observations from the whole-brain results qualitatively (Appendix
B, Table B.3).
Figure 5.3: Increased neural activations (red) and decreased neural activations
(blue) during FEEL>THINK. Probability maps depict significant results for medi-
tators (LTM), meditation-naïve participants (MNP) in A) saggital and axial slices
and B) in a surface-rendered view using the ch2better template and MRIcroN
(www.mricro.com/mricron/install.html). L left, R right, H hemisphere.
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Figure 5.4: Direct group comparisons of neural activations during FEEL>THINK
and FEEL>baseline (B) E. Higher activations in meditation-naïve participants
(MNP) compared to meditators (LTM) are depicted in red, lower activations in
blue. L left and R right.
Table 5.2: Group comparison of brain activations during FEEL compared to THINK
Brain regions BA n of Voxels Coordinates t p
x y z
FEEL>THINK - Activations
MNP>LTM
Frontal Pole M/L 6 (DMPFC) 4050 -8 60 20 4.88 < .0001
Superior Medial Frontal M/L 6 -14 30 60 4.56
Inferior Frontal L 45 (Broca) 1293 -60 26 -4 4.71 < .001
Cerebellum R Culmen 839 32 -64 -26 3.84 .012
LTM>MNP
No sign. difference
Clusterwise corrected with p = .05 (FWE) at whole-brain level.
Abbreviations LTM mid-to-long-term meditators, MNP meditation-naïve participants, BA Brodmann area,
DMPFC dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, R right, L left, M medial
One indentation: absolute cluster maxima, two indentations: local clustermaxima.
Stereotaxic coordinates based on the human atlas of MNI, BA based on Talairach Daemon labels in FSL view.
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Table 5.3: Group comparison of brain activations during FEEL and THINK
Brain regions BA n of Voxels Coordinates t p
x y z
FEEL>B
MNP>LTM
Superior Medial Frontal M 6 (DMPFC) 666 -6 8 64 4.69 .039
Paracingulate M/L 9 1446 -14 52 16 4.32 < .001
Anterior Cingulum L/M 32 4 44 0 4.10
Frontal Pole L/M 9/10 -12 64 28 3.85
Inferior Frontal L 45/44(Broca) 1154 -42 30 2 4.72 .0017
LTM>MNP
Middle Frontal R 8/9 752 44 32 40 3.4 .0215
THINK>B
No sign. group differences
Clusterwise corrected with p = .05 (FWE) at whole-brain level.
Abbreviations LTM mid-to-long-term meditators, MNP meditation-naïve participants, BA Brodmann area,
DMPFC dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, R right, L left, M medial
One indentation: absolute cluster maxima, two indentations: local clustermaxima.
Stereotaxic coordinates are based on the human atlas of MNI, BA are based on Talairach Daemon labels in FSL
view.
Discussion
This study aimed to elucidate neural correlates of short periods of mindful self-awareness
(FEEL) in meditators (LTM) and meditation-naïve participants (MNP).
The question was, to what extend these groups would show typical neural correlates
of mindful self-awareness and in which areas they would differ. To bring the results in
perspective, we compared behavioral measures regarding task experience and psychometric
measures.
Affective ratings and questionnaire results We found little difference between
groups regarding their subjective experiences during the task. Affective ratings after
THINK and FEEL did not differ and they reported similar task success and ease of
initiating the conditions. However, MNP reported a bigger verbal component during
mindful self-awareness. Labeling of experience is a common practice in formal mindfulness
training (Creswell et al., 2007), particularly in introductory courses (Brown et al., 2007).
It would make sense that meditation-untrained participants use a labeling strategy during
a mindful self-awareness task. Thus, we interpret the higher verbal component not merely
as mind-wandering, but as (mindful) labeling of present moment experience (Lieberman
et al., 2007), especially since task success was rated similarly. Of course, we can not rule
out that groups differed in task success, but had different standards for rating their success:
LTM might have compared it to “good” meditation while MNP have less reference for
mindful states or MNP might simply be less aware of mind-wandering, and consequently
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be less reliable to report success during FEEL (Grossman, 2011). However, we think that
for short periods of 12 s, groups might still be comparable in their ability to report their
experience. In fact, MNP did observe and report increased levels of verbal labeling during
FEEL. Overall, the fact that experience during our task was similar renders our group
comparison more meaningful, and implications for mindfulness-related clinical therapies
more relevant.
Regarding our questionnaire results, LTM only scored higher in two of the five facets of
trait mindfulness and we found no differences in levels of alexithymia. Reasons could be
a limited comparability of self-report mindfulness questionnaires between meditators and
non-meditators (Grossman and Van Dam, 2011; Van Dam et al., 2009) or the high IQ
and education of our samples which could decrease differences between the groups (Baer
et al., 2008).
Neural correlates of mindful self-awareness in meditation-naïve and
mindfulness meditators The FEEL condition revealed reduced activations in CMS
in both groups in prefrontal regions and the precuneus/PCC and cuneus. This pattern
confirms our hypothesized down-regulation of cognitive self-referential CMS regions asso-
ciated with the default mode network and mind-wandering (Gusnard et al., 2001) during
mindful self-awareness. The direct group comparison revealed that reductions in prefrontal
CMS regions were significantly larger and more extensive in LTM. This is consistent
with the findings of Farb et al. (2007), who observed more pronounced deactivations in
participants of an MBSR course compared to meditation-naïve subjects. Still, reduced
mid-line prefrontal and PCC activations during FEEL were also observed in MNP, similar
to results of Herwig et al. (2010). Thus, while mindfulness training seems to increase
typical mindfulness-related CMS reductions and the neural distinction between mindful
self-awareness and cognitive self-reference, we observed the basic pattern of decreased
CMS activations already in mindfulness-naïve participants.
With regards to reported DMPFC activations in the previous study by (Herwig et al.,
2010), we note that LTM showed increases in a dorsal DMPFC/pre-SMA region just
adjacent to the described reductions during FEEL. Thus, we have to be precise in de-
scribing the exact loci of mid-line findings in self-referential tasks. The fact that DMPFC
activations were only reported by Herwig et al. (2010) and replicated in LTM in the
current study indicates that they might be related to the purely internal task design, as
opposed to self-referential tasks using external stimulation (trait-adjectives). The exact
functions of the pre-SMA are still being investigated, but apart from motor functions, it
has been linked to internally guided action, action intentions and monitoring (Nachev
et al., 2007) or to the salience network regulating the default mode network (Bonnelle
et al., 2012). Both interpretations would fit, as our purely internal task is close to actual
mindfulness practice, but consequently demands more intention, attention and monitoring
from participants, and as we found distinct SMA activations during FEEL in LTM only
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who also exhibited larger reductions in typical default mode regions during this condition.
Only LTM displayed significant reductions in the left inferior prefrontal areas including
the language related Broca’s area, which has also been linked to affective labeling tasks
in meditation-naïve samples (Lieberman et al., 2007; Torrisi et al., 2013). This could
correspond to the self-reported difference in verbal experience during FEEL between
the groups, indicating less verbal labeling of inner experience or inner speech during
self-reflective processes (Morin and Michaud, 2007) in LTM.
Regarding the hypothesized reductions in amygdala/hippocampus areas, associated with
emotional arousal (Phan et al., 2003), group differences were less clear. In the whole-brain,
LTM showed significant reductions during mindful self-awareness, but the direct group
comparison revealed no significant differences between groups. We did not find signifi-
cant amygdala reductions in meditation-naïve participants as reported by Herwig et al.
(2010). If the emotion-balancing effect of mindful self-awareness is similar but smaller in
meditation-naïve participants, differences in sample size could explain the current null
finding. Herwig et al. (2010) analysed 27 subjects, while the current study had only 19,
and the study by Farb et al. (2007) only 16 meditation-naïve participants. Mindfulness
related affect-labeling tasks, have already demonstrated regulative effects on the amygdala
in meditation-naïve participants (Lieberman et al., 2007), particularly related to high
trait mindfulness (Creswell et al., 2007; Modinos et al., 2010). But other factors might
be more relevant in untrained participants, such as levels of depressiveness (Way et al.,
2010).
We found no group differences regarding activations in right somatosensory and posterior
insula during FEEL. Activations in these regions were reported by Herwig et al. (2010),
but only in mindfulness trained participants by Farb et al. (2007). Our results indicate
that activations in regions associated with somatosensory attention and present moment
awareness (Bauer et al., 2014; Critchley et al., 2004) are already found in meditation-naïve
participants. Similarly, we did not find a group difference in parietal regions, as described
by Farb et al. (2007) who found bilateral activation in meditators and only left-sided
parietal activation in meditation-naïve. In line with Herwig et al. (2010) we find bilateral
parietal activation in both groups. These inconsistencies in somatosensory and parietal
regions might be related to the verbal stimulus driven design of Farb et al. (2007)’s
experiment, which compared to our design might have been harder for meditation-naïve
participants, and might have covered first mindfulness-related activations.
To sum up, we did not find previously suggested significant group differences in amygdala,
insula and somatosensory cortex during mindful self-awareness. But we confirm reduced
prefrontal CMS activations which mindfulness trained subjects showed to a significantly
larger degree. We further identified significant reductions in left inferior prefrontal ac-
tivation in this group, probably reflecting a smaller verbal component during mindful
self-awareness.
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Clinical relevance Mindful self-awareness was associated with decreased activation
in prefrontal and posterior CMS and in the amygdala/hippocampus formation in LTM.
This suggests that mindful states in general, but particularly in meditators, are associated
with decreased activation in regions associated with rumination and being caught up
in thought (Brewer et al., 2013) and emotional arousal (Phan et al., 2003). Similar
associations were found in healthy individuals during rest, where amygdala activation
was negatively related to trait mindfulness (Way et al., 2010). And Hölzel et al. (2009)
demonstrated reduced grey matter density in the amygdala associated with stress reduction
after MBSR training. Here we add further evidence that mindful awareness is associated
with emotionally-balanced, de-centered self-referential processing.
Limitations and future research Our observations regarding training induced
changes in LTM must be taken with a grain of salt, as we found no association between
life-time hours of meditation or intensity of meditation training and LTM results. The
highly diverse experience concerning all mindfulness-related practices in our relatively
small LTM sample might have made it difficult to detect such significant developmental
trajectories in our data. As a group, however, our LTM results are in line with previous
findings after MBCT training (Farb et al., 2007). However, neither study is longitudi-
nal. Thus, conclusions about mindfulness training and associated changes in self-related
processes need to be backed up in longitudinal studies (Davidson, 2010). Related to our
cross-sectional design, we also can not rule out that demand characteristics or subject
selection affected the result; i.e. meditators might have consciously or unconsciously tried
to conform to the image associated with meditators, or meditators might have differed
from meditation-naïve participants in personality-related factors in the first place.
Our conclusions on significant brain activations are built on whole-brain FWE error
correction using random field theory. With regards to affective sciences, such corrections
are often employed to avoid both Type I and Type II errors (Lieberman and Cunningham,
2009). Further, our analysis of previous studies lead to a concise set of regions of interest,
which we explored in our current sample. Still, meta-analysis are needed to verify the
current knowledge of brain activation during mindful self-awareness. Finally, we note
that the findings regarding the amygdala are tentative, as activations in this area are
challenging to measure with fMRI (Lipp et al., 2014), and recent research suggests a
strong influence of blood flow changes in a nearby vessel, which is related to activations
in other, distant brain regions (Boubela et al., 2015). However, this finding was mainly
based on external emotional stimuli, which were not employed in our task. Still, in a
further step, explorations of functional networks during mindful self-awareness should
complement our results, to overcome the limits of studying local brain activation.
As mentioned, longitudinal studies are needed to further elucidate developmental tra-
jectories of self-related processes related to mindfulness training. Such studies would
further allow us to extend our limited knowledge on mindful self-awareness to more diverse
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samples and clinical populations. By studying neural and behavioral differences during
states of mindful self-awareness, we could potentially predict who will profit most from
mindfulness interventions. Integrating the results from our study and previous studies,
we suggest potential neural markers in the CMS, amygdala/hippocampus regions, left
inferior prefrontal, and somatosensory areas.
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Abstract
Mental health benefits of mindfulness techniques are thought to involve changes in self-
processing, such as decreased attachment to the self, higher self-compassion and lower
emotional reactivity to inner experience. However, self-related emotion processing in
regular mindfulness practitioners is not extensively studied. In the current work we
investigate differential neural and behavioral correlates of self-criticism and self-praise in
22 mid-to-long-term mindfulness meditators (LTM) compared to 22 matched meditation-
naive participants (MNP).
In an fMRI experiment, participants were presented with blocks of individually selected
positive (self-praise, SP), negative (self-critical, SC), negative but not self-critical (NNSC),
and general, neutral (NT) adjectives, and reported their affective state after the blocks.
On the neural level, both SP and SC yielded more activation in the dorso-medial prefrontal
cortex (DMPFC) in LTM compared to MNP. Activation in this region correlated positively
with non-react scores of the Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) and showed
decreased functional connectivity to posterior midline and parietal regions in LTM
compared to MNP during both self-related appraisals. Further, we found evidence for
emotional reactivity in LTM on the neural level, particularly during SP. On the behavioral
level, a mixed effects analysis revealed significantly higher differences in affective ratings
after blocks of SC compared to SP in MNP compared to LTM.
Differences in DMPFC activation and affective ratings point towards increased awareness,
potentially mindful regulation of SC and SP in LTM, while decreased connectivity to
other regions of the default mode network could reflect a decreased self-focus in this group.
As such, our results illustrate differences in self-related emotional processes in meditators
and offer clinically relevant insights into mechanisms of mindful emotion regulation when
facing self-criticism and self-praise.
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Introduction
Self-related emotional processes are often disturbed in affective disorders. For exam-
ple, depressed patients display a stronger and more negative self-focus (Greenberg and
Pyszczynski, 1986; Joormann and Gotlib, 2010; Northoff, 2007) and increased rumina-
tion about negative aspects of the self (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), while excessive
self-critical thinking represents a vulnerability factor to depressive symptoms (Sherry
et al., 2012). Despite the fundamental role of such self-related processes for mental health,
research has only started to investigate disturbances of the self in affective disorders and
possible mechanisms of change (Northoff, 2007).
At the same time, concepts like mindfulness and self-compassion have been increasingly in-
corporated into psychotherapy programs with the goal of facilitating healthier self-related
processes (Keng et al., 2011; Baer et al., 2006). Mindfulness is often defined as purpose-
ful attention on momentary experiences in a non-judgemental way (Brown et al., 2007;
Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Such a mindful state can be trained through meditation techniques
and is believed to ultimately increase mindful behavior in everyday life (Kiken et al.,
2015), for example in the facets: acting with awareness, non-judging and non-reacting to
inner experiences, describing experiences, and observing (Baer et al., 2006). In relation to
self-referential processes, a mindful present-moment focus can lead to a less attached and
biased relation towards the self (Bishop et al., 2004) and less concerns with self-esteem
(Brown et al., 2007). Moreover, self-related emotions might be faced less judgmentally and
in a more accepting (Linehan, 1994), self-compassionate way (Neff, 2003; Thompson and
Waltz, 2008). Thus, mindfulness and self-compassion presumably lead to better emotion
regulation skills with regards to self-related emotions, like dampening the negative effects
of excessive self-critical thinking (Bishop et al., 2004; Hollis-Walker and Colosimo, 2011).
Similarly, theoretical frameworks of mindfulness and neurobiological correlates propose
changes in self-related functions as key mechanisms of salutary effects of mindfulness
(Hölzel et al., 2011; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012).
Despite these proposed mechanisms and the clinical necessity to understand mindfulness-
related changes in self-related processes, research in this area is scarce, particularly
regarding the neural level (Hölzel et al., 2011). One influential study on mindful self-
referential processing after a mindfulness course found a shift from a narrative self-reference,
which they associated with cortical mid-line areas like the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex
(DMPFC) towards a more experiential body awareness (Farb et al., 2007). However, other
studies report increases in mid-line areas related to mindfulness, as during mindful affect
labeling (Creswell et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2007), mindful self-awareness (Herwig
et al., 2010), and mindful perception of emotional stimuli in meditation-naive participants
(Lutz et al., 2014) and also in mindfulness meditators during mindful breathing (Hölzel
et al., 2007).
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Many studies on self-related processes contain a factor of decision making, i.e. participants
judge whether a particular adjective describes themselves versus someone else (Northoff
et al., 2006). Studying self-referential processes and particularly self-related emotions
in this way involves decision making aspects, which arguably occur to a much lesser
degree in every-day self-appraisals. A recent study therefore investigated negative and
positive self-appraisals in the form of individual inner talk (Brühl et al., 2014). Both
conditions activated the DMPFC and dorso-lateral prefrontal (DLPFC) regions, while
positive appraisals showed stronger activations in emotion generative regions (amyg-
dala/ventral striatum). This study, being close to every-day self-appraising thoughts,
has high ecological validity, but the appraisals were not reported to the experimenters,
thus the emotional involvement and relevance for the individual was not fully controlled.
A study by Doerig et al. (2014), used self-critical stimuli that had been individually
chosen and evaluated by each participant before a block-designed fMRI experiment. For
self-critical stimuli, they reported neural activity in regions involved in emotion gener-
ation (anterior insula/hippocampus/amygdala formation), and bilateral frontal areas,
presumably representing cognitive reappraisal of the evoked negative affect. They further
reported activations in mid-line prefrontal areas for self-criticism. However, the study
was limited to negative aspects of the self and no behavioral measure complemented the
results.
The goal of the current study is to extend the clinically relevant but limited knowledge on
mindful processing of self-related emotions. By extending Doerig et al. (2014)’s paradigm,
we studied differential neural and behavioral correlates of individualized self-criticism
(SC) and self-praise (SP) in meditators with experience in Vipassana and closely related
mindfulness practices (Lutz et al., 2008) compared to matched meditation-naive controls.
We focused on the Vipassana tradition, because it influenced current secular, clinical pro-
grams like Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) or Cognitive Therapy (MBCT)
(Chiesa and Malinowski, 2011), and would potentially allow first translational insights
into altered self-related emotional processes through mindfulness training.
We hypothesized that 1) mid-to-long-term, regular mindfulness meditators (LTM) would
show decreased habitual emotional reactivity to emotional, self-referential stimuli (SC and
SP) both by decreased activity in emotion processing areas (extended amygdala/hippocampus
region) and/or differential affective experience based on affective ratings after blocks of
SC and SP. Similarly, we hypothesized 2) differential activity in prefrontal, self-referential
and regulative areas, mainly DLPFC and DMPFC regions. Given the mixed findings for
prefrontal areas, we formulated this hypothesis non-directional. In addition, we explored
neural correlations with particular aspects of trait mindfulness and differences in the
functional connectivity between LTM and MNP.
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Materials and methods
Subjects Mid-to-long-term meditation practitioners (LTM) were recruited via local
meditation groups and personal contacts. We required meditators to have more than
one year of meditation experience with at least one year of regular Vipassana training,
Vipassana retreat experience and a current practice of at least one hour per week. We
included 22 LTM (ages: 28-67, mean = 47, SD = 11.11, 10 female) with an average of
4‘861.50 lifetime practice hours in Vipassana or closely related open monitoring meditation
techniques (Lutz et al., 2008) (range 281-18325), and an average of 5971 hours (range
506-18805) when considering all meditation experience in this group (see Appendix A, for
full disclosure of LTMs mindfulness-related experience and current practice).
LTM were matched with 22 nearly or completely meditation-naive participants (MNP,
ages: 29-64, mean = 45.45, SD = 10.94, 8 female), recruited via mailing lists and
personal contacts. For matching statistics see Appendix A, Tables A.4 and A.5. MNP
did not have a current or recent meditation practice (Appendix A, Table A.3). Matching
variables were age, gender, years of education and highest degree of education, general
field of occupation, and crystalline intelligence measured with Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-
Intelligenztest (MWT-B, Lehrl, 1977).
All subjects were right-handed according to a handedness questionnaire (Annett, 1970)
and without self-declared mental or neurological disorders. Further exclusion criteria
were intake of psychotropic drugs, consumption of alcohol >7 units/week, cigarettes
>10 units/day, or coffee ( >10 cups/day) and general contraindications against MRI
examinations.
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the canton of Zurich and conducted
in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 1992). All
participants gave written informed consent and received a financial compensation.
Experimental design
Questionnaires Within a week before scanning, participants completed a set of ques-
tionnaires via an online investigation tool (Unipark, QuestBack).
Of particular interest for this study were trait mindfulness and self-compassion. Mindful-
ness was assessed by the Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006,
German version: Translation by Ströhle et al., 2010, KIMS-D-Items, 2010; Michalak et al.,
2008), with the facets: 1) observing and 2) describing sensations, perceptions, thoughts
and feelings, 3) acting with awareness, 4) non-judging of, and 5) non-reactivity to inner
experience. For self-compassion we administered the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS, Neff,
2003, German version: Hupfeld and Ruffieux, 2011).
Further, we assessed the ability to identify and describe emotions with the Toronto Alex-
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ithymia Scale (TAS, Taylor et al., 1985, German version: Bach et al., 1996), participant’s
sociodemographics, and experience with meditation and mindfulness-related techniques.
Before scanning we administered the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS,
Watson et al., 1988, German version: Krohne et al., 1996) to control for mood before
scanning. After scanning, participants were asked in a structured interview about fatigue,
general experience, pain, and discomfort during scanning.
Stimuli Stimuli consisted of negative and positive personality-descriptive adjectives
from the groups: appearance, social aspects, transient condition, talents, and dispositions
and neutral words (Angleitner et al., 1990). The construction of 52 negative and neutral
adjectives has been described in Doerig et al. (2014) and has been adopted for the
additional list of 52 positive adjectives in the current experiment.
Within a week before scanning, participants selected via the online investigation tool
all applicable, but a minimum of six self-critical (SC) adjectives, and six negative, but
not self-relevant and thus not self-critical (NNSC) adjectives from the list of negative
adjectives. From the list of positive adjectives they selected all applicable, but a minimum
of six self-praising (SP) adjectives. They further rated the adjectives regarding their
subjective negative and positive valence (e.g. for SC-stimuli: “How negative do you
perceive this trait?”) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “1: not at all” to “5: very
much”.
For experimental stimulation, each adjective was supplemented with three synonymical
adjectives from the same self-schema (compare Doerig et al., 2014).
Experiment The experiment is based on Doerig et al. (2014)’s paradigm, extended
with a self-praising condition and affective ratings.
The four conditions (SC, SP, NNSC, NT) and interjacent blocks of rest were presented in
pseudo-randomised order. The introduction varied depending on the respective condition
(self-criticism: “I am too”; self-praise: “I am very”, negative non-self-referential: “I am
not”; neutral: “it is”), followed by a fixation cross. Subsequently, the four adjectives
relating to a particular self-schema were presented, separated by fixation crosses. A block
lasted for 24 s. Subjects were instructed to focus on the meaning of the adjectives and
any emotional response triggered by the adjectives. During the blocks of rest, subjects
were asked to relax and do nothing in particular. LTM were specifically reminded to not
meditate during the task or rest periods. After SC, SP, NNSC and NT blocks we acquired
affective ratings and showed a fixation cross (duration: 2 s + not used affective rating
time). Each condition and rest periods were presented six times, resulting in 30 blocks
and a total scan time of 15 min 15 s (see Figure 5.5).
All negative, positive and neutral adjectives were presented only once. Two versions of
the task were created, starting either with SC or SP. Subjects were randomly assigned to
a version, each version was administered to half of the participants in each group. The
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Figure 5.5: Schematic representation of one experimental block (SC condition)
including times of presentation. Introduction depended on the respective condition.
task was programmed with PresentationTM, Neurobehavioral Systems, USA and was
presented via digital goggles (Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA, USA). Subjects
completed a trial run with meaningless adjectives before scanning.
Affective rating As a manipulation check and insight into subjective experience
during the experiment, we acquired affective ratings using a track ball (Current Designs,
Philadelphia, USA) within a maximal time window of 6 s. To ensure participants would
not mis-identify the affective rating as the main goal of the study, the instruction was
to spontaneously answer the question "How do you feel in this moment?" but mainly
focus on the task with the adjectives. Ratings were given on a discrete scale with the
Self-Assessment Mannikins as 5 anchoring points (Bradley and Lang, 1994). The discrete
scale was coded in steps of 1, ranging from -250 (= Mannikin very unhappy) to 250
(=Mannikin very happy) with 0 as neutral.
Since ratings of an individual were correlated (ICC1 0.53), the nested data structure had
to be taken into account. We formulated a linear mixed model to explain the relation
between the dependent variable rating and the fixed effects group and condition. Condition
had SC as the reference level and further contained SP and the two non-self-referential
conditions NNSC and NT. The group factor had two levels (LTM, MNP). Our model
contained a random effect for each subject1. Since we hypothesized group differences in
ratings after self-related emotional conditions but not after non-self related conditions we
further included an interaction term for group and condition. Adding the group condition
interaction significantly improved model fit (χ2(3) = 12.75, p = .005). Analysis of the
mixed effects model was conducted using the lme4 library (Bates et al., 2014) in RStudio
(Integrated development environment for R, RStudio, 2012). ICC was calculated using
the multilevel package (Bliese, 2013), 95% confidence intervals were calculated using the
bootstrap method.
1We determined the random effects structure of our model by comparing model fits between a
random intercept and a random intercept random slope for subject in group. The latter decreased
the model fit. Thus our final model contained a random effect for subject.
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Image acquisition Scanning was performed at the University Hospital of Psychiatry
(Zurich, Switzerland) using a 3-T Philips Intera whole-body MR unit equipped with a
Philips SENSE head coil. With a sensitivity-encoded (Pruessmann et al., 1999) singleshot
echo-planar sequence (SENSE-sshEPI), 305 T2*-weighted echo planar image volumes with
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were acquired (repetition-time (TR)/echo-
time (TE): 3000/30 ms, 36 transversal slices, whole brain, slice thickness: 4.0 mm, field
of view (FOV): 240x240 mm, matrix 80x80 voxel, resulting voxel size: 3x3x4 mm,
orientation, SENSE-factor: 2.0). For each participant, a T1-weighted high-resolution
image was acquired (TR/TE 6.73/3.1 ms; voxel size 1x1x1 mm, 145 slices, sagittal
orientation, FOV: 230x225x225 mm).
Image pre-processing Preprocessing and statistical analyses were conducted with
the FSL software toolbox (Oxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of
the Brain, FMRIB, Smith et al., 2004). Preprocessing of the functional data included
motion correction (MCFLIRT, Jenkinson et al., 2002), non-brain removal (BET, Smith,
2002), spatial smoothing (full-width half-maximum) with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm, grand-
mean intensity normalisation (FILM prewhitening, Woolrich et al., 2001) and highpass
temporal filtering with a cutoff period of 100 s. Pre-processed functional images were
spatially registered to each subject’s skull-stripped high-resolution anatomical image using
a boundary-based registration algorithm (BBR, Greve and Fischl, 2009). Normalisation
of the high resolution structural image to the standard space (Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI)-152 template) was carried out using linear registration with 6 degrees of
freedom (FLIRT, Jenkinson and Smith, 2001, Jenkinson et al., 2002) and further refined
using FNIRT nonlinear registration using 12 degrees of freedom (Andersson et al., 2007).
General linear model image analyses Whole-brain analysis was conducted using
the standard general linear model (GLM) approach, implemented in FEAT (FMRI Expert
Analysis Tool) Version 6.00. First-level analysis comprised a fixed-effect model for each
subject, with box car functions for the four condition regressors (SC, SP, NNSC, NT),
convolved with a canonical double-gamma hemodynamic response function including
temporal derivatives. Extended movement regressors were entered as nuisance regressors
(6 motion parameters including their derivatives (+6) and the squares of the parameters
and derivatives (+12)). Affective rating periods (scale, modeled as boxcars with scale
onset and the reaction time of the trial as duration) were entered as regressors of no
interest. Z (Gaussianised T) statistic images were calculated for our contrasts of interest
SC >NT and SP >NT. For reasons explained in the behavioral results section, we did
not analyze SC >NNSC.
Second-level group comparison of the first-level results was carried out using a mixed-effects
model implemented in FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects, Beckmann
et al., 2003, Woolrich et al., 2004, Woolrich, 2008). The whole-brain contrasts were
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thresholded and FWE-corrected using clusters determined by z > 2.3 and a cluster
significance threshold of p < 0.05 (based on Gaussian Random Field Theory) (Worsley,
2001).
Conjunction and correlation analysis In a conjunction analysis between SP
>NT and SC >NT we determined group difference in emotional self-referential processes
independent of valence, using the conjunction null method based on the minimum statistic
(Nichols et al., 2005). To further investigate group differences in our contrasts of interest,
we computed Pearson correlations between facets of mindfulness that differed between
groups and percent signal changes in the conjunction cluster. We further exploratively
correlated percent signal change in the conjunction with total hours of practice adjusted
for age (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007) and with practice intensity (Fox et al., 2012).
However, given the heterogeneity of mindfulness-related experience in our LTM sample
we did not expect significant correlations. Functional mean activation from the cluster
were extracted for each participant and converted to percentage signal change as outlined
by Mumford (2007).
Psycho-physiological interaction Based on the result from the conjunction anal-
ysis, we explored differences in functional connectivity between groups during self-related
emotional conditions (EMO). To this end, we collapsed SC and SP conditions into a single
EMO regressor and conducted a psycho-physiological interaction analysis (PPI, Friston
et al., 1997), in which the activation in the conjunction cluster (SEED) was compared to
linearly detrended whole-brain fMRI activations (TARGET). In this GLM, we entered
the fMRI time-series from the seed (extracted on the subject level, with the conjunction
cluster transformed into the individual’s functional space) as the physiological regressor
(PHYS) and the EMO regressor. Other task regressors (NNSC, NT) and confound
regressors (affective ratings periods, movement) were the same as in the standard GLM
analysis. To test the PPI in the generalized, most sensitive form for block designs (Cisler
et al., 2014), we included separate PPI terms for the EMO conditions (PHYS×EMO) and
NT (PHYS×NT) and modeled the PPI effect of interest as the contrast between these
regressors (PHYS×EMO >PHYS×NT), including the analogous negative relationship
(PHYS×NT >PHYS×EMO). On the group level, we compared group differences in these
functional connectivity patterns (PPI LTM versus PPI MNP). In order to disentangle
this slightly complex double-regression and get at the underlying linear relations between
seed and target regions, we checked if regions that were significantly different in the group
comparison (LTM >MNP), showed positive or negative PPI effects in the mean single
group results. We applied the same statistical thresholds and FWE-correction as in the
main analysis.
43
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Results
Stimulus selection and questionnaire results Groups did not differ in the
number of self-chosen SC and SP stimuli, nor in the positive (for SP) or negative (for SC)
evaluation of their stimuli before the scan (Appendix C, Table C.1).
Comparing trait mindfulness, measured with the FFMQ, we found significantly higher
scores for LTM only for two of five factors, namely for observe (t(42) = −2.38, p = .02) and
non-react (t(42) = −3.30, p = .002). Further, LTM showed higher self-compassion (SCS)
and lower alexithymia (TAS) scores compared to MNP. Both differences showed a trend
but were not significant (Appendix A, Table A.6). Using a fdr correction for the group
comparisons in all 13 questionnaire-measures, only non-react was significantly different.
Both groups reported similar levels of positive and negative affect before scanning. After
scanning, they indicated similar levels of comfort during the scan. There was a trend
towards more reported tiredness during the scan in MNP (Appendix A, Table A.7 ).
Affective rating Behavioral analysis is based on 41 subjects (nLTM = 22, nMNP =
19)2, of which 34 did not miss any rating, 5 missed 1, and 2 missed 3 ratings. Mean mood
rating during the scan across all subjects and conditions was 100.80, which represents an
overall neutral to slightly positive mood on our Self-Assessment Mannikins scale.
In the linear mixed effect model, condition significantly predicted affect. Compared to SC
(b = 46.74, CI [15.75, 78.26]), all conditions lead to a significantly higher affective rating
(NT b = 84.91, CI [53.64, 119.03], NNSC b = 107.05, CI [75.04, 139.09], SP b = 139.69,
CI [107.14, 170.99]), confirming our experimental manipulation (see Figure 5.6). Group
did not significantly predict overall affective ratings (b = 21.02, CI [−14.93, 70.76]). But
the interaction between group and condition was positive for SP and NNSC compared to
SC stimuli, indicating that the difference in affective ratings between self-related positive
compared to self-related negative adjectives was significantly smaller in LTM compared to
MNP (SP b = −32.44, CI [−52.85,−11.75]). As NNSC were experienced significantly less
negative than SC, it could not serve as a negative, non-self referential control condition
for SC and was not further analyzed on the neural level.
2A technical problem with the track ball lead to a high amount of missing responses in three
cases (19, 15 and 10 out of 24).
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Figure 5.6: Affective ratings after each condition for meditators (LTM, orange) and
meditation-naive participants (MNP, purple). Bars indicate fixed effects estimates
of the linear mixed model for each stimulus type within each group. Error bars
depict 95% confidence intervals. NNSC negative not self-critical, NT neutral, SC
self-critical, SP self-praising.
FMRI results Subjects with more than 1.5 mm of head movement in one direction
were excluded from fMRI analysis, resulting in analyzed 41 subjects (Table 5.4), which did
not differ from our full sample in sociodemographics or matching. FMRI results showed
the same regions when adding an additional regressor to control for gender (results not
shown).
Table 5.4: Sociodemographic variables of subjects included in fMRI analysis.
MNP (n = 21) LTM (n = 20)
M SD M SD Statistic (df) p
Age 44.76 10.70 47 11.11 t(39) =-.56 .58
Gender (f/m) 11/10 12/8 χ2(1) = .03 .86
Education (years) 18.24 3.74 19.05 4.50 t(39) =-.66 .51
IQ (MWT-B) 123.33 13.32 118.18 13.19 t(39) = 1.21 .23
Abbreviations MWT-B Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test
Self-relevant versus neutral stimuli SC >NT led to increased activations in
mid-frontal regions, the insula, precuneus and visual areas in both groups (Figure 5.7). At
the group level, we found significantly higher activation in the DMPFC region (superior
frontal/paracingulate, BA 8; 8744 mm3) for LTM compared to MNP.
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The contrast SP >NT resulted in similar but larger and stronger activations compared
to SC >NT in both groups (Figure 5.7). In the group comparison, LTM again showed
significantly more activation in the DMPFC during SP >NT (BA 6, 17400 mm3). Addi-
tionally, we found increased activation for LTM compared to MNP in widespread clusters,
covering left middle-frontal, bilateral inferior prefrontal and insular areas, basal ganglia,
visual areas including the fusiform gyrus, and mid-brain, thalamus, and adjacent left
hippocampal/amygdalar regions.
The conjunction analysis of SC and SP stimuli versus NT resulted in a significant group
difference in the DMPFC area (Table 5.5).
Note that middle-frontal, mid-brain, and hippocampal/amygdalar regions were signifi-
cantly activated in LTM in the SP>NT and SC>NT, while we found no such activations
for MNP. While this difference survived the corrected group comparison only in the SP
>NT contrast, it hints at a quantitative rather than qualitative difference in these regions
between SC >NT and SP >NT for the group comparison (Figure 5.7).
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Table 5.5: Brain activations related to the main effect of group: LTM>MNP
Brain regions BA Coordinates z p
x y z
SC >NT
Superior Frontal/Paracingulate M (DMPFC) 8 -4 34 52 4.09 < .01 ∗∗
SP >NT
Superior Frontal/Paracingulate M (DMPFC) 6 6 16 48 4.28 < .0001 †
Middle Frontal L 6 -34 6 48 3.50
Frontal Pole R 10 32 58 -2 4.11 < .0001 †
Inferior Frontal R 44 48 18 10 3.38
Inferior Frontal L 44/45 -52 36 -6 3.74
Insula R 13 34 22 0 3.67
Insula L 13 -28 20 0 3.92
Putamen R 48 18 10 3.32
Putamen L -24 10 0 3.66
Occipital Lobe/Precuneus/Cuneus M 18/31 -10 -74 28 3.73 < .01 ∗∗
Temporo-occipital Lobe/Fusiform L 19 -24 -56 -4 4.22 < .0001 †
Temporo-occipital Lobe/Fusiform R 19 28 -48 -6 4.15
Brainstem/Medulla -4 -36 -42 3.97
Cerebellum/Pyramis -26 -42 -42 3.89
Conjunction SC >NT AND SP >NT
Superior Frontal/Paracingulate M (DMPFC) 6 6 16 48 3.97 .03 ∗
Clusterwise corrected with p = .05 (FWE) at whole-brain level.
Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, †p<.0001
Abbreviations LTM mid-to-long-term meditators, MNP meditation-naive participants, BA Brodmann area,
DMPFC dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, R right, L left, M medial
One indentation: absolute cluster maxima, two indentations: local clustermaxima.
Stereotaxic coordinates are based on the human atlas of MNI, BA are based on Talairach Daemon labels in FSL
view.
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Figure 5.7: Neural activations of a) self-critical versus neutral (SC>NT) and b)
self-positive versus neutral (SP>NT) stimuli. Probability maps depict significant
results for meditators (LTM, orange), meditation-naive participants (MNP, purple)
and the group comparison LTM>MNP (red).
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Correlation results Correlation analysis between mean activation of the DMPFC
cluster resulting from the conjunction analysis (see Appendix C, Figure C.2) and the FFMQ
factors observe and non-react revealed significant correlations with non-react. For SP >NT
it was r(39) = .32, p = .04. Examining the individual groups, we found that the correlation
was driven by LTM (r(19) = .49, p = .03), while there was no significant association
in MNP (r(20) = −.18, p = .44). The difference between the regression slopes after a
Fisher-r-z transformation was significant (z=2.10, p=.04) (Figure 5.8 a). For SC >NT, we
found a significant correlation for both groups together (r(39) = .34, p = .03) and a trend
for LTM (r(19) = .39, p = .09), while MNP showed no correlation (r(20) = −.09, p = .70)
(Figure 5.8 b). However, the correlation coefficients did not differ significantly between
groups (z = 1.49, p = .14). DMPFC activation was not related to hours of meditation
training or practice intensity (p > .20).
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Figure 5.8: Correlations between mean % signal change of the DMPFC conjunction
cluster with FFMQ non-react scores during a) self-critical versus neutral (SC>NT)
and b) self-praising versus neutral (SP>NT).
Psycho-physiological interaction For LTM, we did not find a significant difference
in the linear relation (PPI effect) between the DMPFC and another region in the brain
during self-related emotional conditions (EMO) compared to NT. For MNP, we found
a positive PPI effect for EMO compared to NT, in regions comprising the precuneus
area extending into occipital/superior parietal regions (left and right), and a cluster in
the left temporal gyrus. In the group comparison MNP>LTM, we found similar regions,
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namely clusters in the precuneus/occipital areas (see Figure 5.9), indicating that MNP
showed stronger functional connectivity with these regions during EMO compared to NT
conditions (for a schematic representation see Appendix C, Figure C.3).
Figure 5.9: Functional connectivity difference between emotional self-relataded
(EMO) and neutral (NT) stimuli for MNP (purple) and for the group comparison
MNP>LTM (red). Areas in the precuneus and occipito-parietal regions were
found in both analyses. Cluster coordinates of peak activation, region (including
Brodmann area), cluster size, and peak significance are indicated.
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Discussion
This study investigated trait differences in behavioral and neural correlates of indi-
vidualized positive and negative self-appraisals between mindfulness meditators and
meditation-naive participants, during a non-meditation task. We hypothesized habitual
differences between these groups when confronted with self-referential emotional stimuli,
more specifically a decreased emotional reactivity to such stimuli in meditators. Indeed,
we found less extreme affective ratings after self-appraisals in this group. On the neural
level, they showed more pronounced activation during self-appraisals in frontal and limbic
regions, particularly during positive self-appraisal. Further, their DMPFC activation
correlated with a non-reacting attitude towards inner experience and was less functionally
connected with posterior mid-line and parietal regions.
Questionnaire and behavioral results To our surprise, the groups showed only
few differences in measures of mindfulness and related constructs. One reason could be the
limited comparability of self-report mindfulness questionnaires between meditators and
non-meditators (Grossman and Van Dam, 2011; Van Dam et al., 2009) despite matched
samples (Baer, 2011). Our groups differed in the factor non-react, reflecting a difference
in general emotion regulation, i.e. allowing inner experiences and feelings to come and go
(Hölzel et al., 2011). Non-react has been found to predict general well-being, decreased
psychological symptoms (Baer et al., 2006), and increases with mindfulness training (Baer
et al., 2008). For self-compassion we only found a group difference in the total score at
trend level, and only if not corrected for multiple-comparisons. Again, this is somewhat
surprising, given the reported relations between mindfulness and self-compassion (Hollis-
Walker and Colosimo, 2011). One reason might be that open monitoring techniques
have no particular focus on self-compassion (Lutz et al., 2007). Thus, other factors
such as life-style or working in the field of mental health might influence the level of
self-compassion similarly or more (Baer et al., 2008). Overall, the fact that the groups did
not differ more regarding the questionnaires might also reflect a strength of the current
study. We ensured a good matching of LTM with a healthy control group, consisting
of equally high-functioning individuals, with on average good education, high levels of
intelligence, and a comparable percentage working in mental health related areas. Thus,
group differences we do find in our study are arguably also be less influenced by selection
bias and demand characteristics, which are potential confounds in cross-sectional studies
with meditators (Davidson, 2010).
Affective ratings We found group differences in affective ratings after blocks of SP
compared to SC, suggesting that the difference between positive experience after SP and
negative experience after SC was less pronounced for LTM. This pattern is in line with
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the notion of increased emotional balance as a result of mindfulness training. When faced
with self-appraisals, LTM potentially appraised them in a more detached, non-reactive
way, identifying less strongly with these stimuli (Hölzel et al., 2011). This interpretation
is corroborated by the fact that we did not find a difference in affective ratings after NT
blocks and that the number of chosen adjectives and their evaluation before the scan was
the same for the two groups. However, we can not fully rule out demand characteristics,
since LTM are probably aware of the assumed relation between emotional reactivity and
mindfulness training. At the same time, meditators might be more aware of their affective
state and better able to describe their affects (Fox et al., 2012; Sze et al., 2010). The
tendency of lower TAS scores in our LTM sample points into the same direction. Thus,
differences in affective ratings between groups must be interpreted with caution.
FMRI Results In general SC and SP showed similar activation patterns, in both
groups. Brühl et al. (2014) also reported similar activation during self-criticism and
self-praise, corroborating the notion that different emotional experiences share similar
brain regions (Lindquist et al., 2012). Group differences were hypothesized in emotion
processing, self-referential and regulative prefrontal areas.
Differences in emotion-generative structures during self-criticism and
self-praise Unlike the previous study by Doerig et al. (2014), we observed no consistent
amygdala activation during SC. On this basis, our hypothesis regarding group-differences
in this region can not be answered completely. However, LTM showed activation bordering
the left hippocampus/amygdala region for SC >NT and a similar activation during SP
>NT, while we found no such pattern for MNP. Only the latter was significantly different
in the group comparison. For these regions, we propose a quantitative threshold effect
rather than a qualitative difference, and interpret that LTM show evidence for stronger
emotional processing of both self-referential conditions compared to NT. We found a
similar pattern for visual cortex activations, which could reflect less cognitive avoidance
(Servaas et al., 2014), again suggesting stronger emotional processing in LTM. These
findings might reflect higher present-moment awareness and acceptance of emotions in this
group, which is partly in line with the finding of decreased control over emotion generative
structures during emotional stimulation in experienced meditators (Taylor et al., 2011).
However, it contradicts previous findings of decreased activation in emotion-generative
structures in meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Chiesa et al., 2013).
For SP >NT, there was additional evidence for increased emotional processing in LTM
compared to MNP. LTM showed increased activation in the ventromedial orbitofrontal
cortex/ventral striatum, which could indicate higher reward and subjective pleasantness
of positive self-appraisals (Kühn and Gallinat, 2012; McClure et al., 2004). Further,
the insula, another key region for emotion generation and experience, showed increased
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activation in LTM, which could signify stronger emotional arousal resulting from less
regulation and more acceptance of emotional states (Grant et al., 2011), or higher
emotional awareness and monitoring of internal states during self-related emotions (Craig,
2004; Lutz et al., 2008).
Overall, neural activations in emotion generative structures seemed increased for both
valences in LTM, contradicting our behavioral results. A possible explanation is the
timing of stimulation and rating: LTM might have been more accepting and aware of
their immediate affective reaction during SP and SC blocks instead of regulating their
experience. Such a non-reactive attitude could result in increased emotional processing
during emotional stimulation, similar to findings by (Taylor et al., 2011), while affective
ratings after the actual experience might be less extreme.
Differential activation in regulative prefrontal and mid-line structures
Similar to previous studies by Doerig et al. (2014) and Brühl et al. (2014) we found acti-
vations in anterior and posterior cortical midline structures associated with self-referential
and autobiographical memory processing and default mode self-reference (Fossati et al.,
2014; Johnson, 2002; Northoff et al., 2006; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011).
Interestingly, these mid-line activations were more pronounced in LTM in both contrasts.
This is consistent with previous research: Creswell et al. (2007) found that higher dis-
positional mindfulness was associated with increased DMPFC activation in an affect
labeling task, and Hölzel et al. (2007) found DMPFC activation in a similar sample of
meditators during meditation compared to arithmetics and suggested increased processing
of emotions, like being aware of, identifying and attending to one’s emotions (Phan
et al., 2004). This is in line with the common functional interpretation of the dorsal
MPFC as the cognitive/appraising part of emotion processing (Etkin et al., 2011; Schmitz
and Johnson, 2006), and could therefore represent a key region for improved emotion
regulation abilities related to mindfulness training (Hölzel et al., 2007). In fact, differential
activation in the DMPFC has also been reported in relation to emotion regulation, in
studies on reappraisal of negative pictures (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner and Gross,
2005). However, studies also report decreased MPFC activation in meditators during
emotional processing in a mindful state (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Grant et al., 2011;
Taylor et al., 2011), and less mid-line, default mode activation in during resting state
(Brewer et al., 2011). Differences in meditation experience might partly explain these
inconsistencies. Deactivations are particularly reported for very experienced meditators
(Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Chiesa et al., 2013). As we found no correlation with
meditation experience in this region we can not add further evidence for this hypothesis.
Other reasons for the contradictory results might lie in the specific task (e.g. active
self-reference) and location of mid-line activation (dorsal versus ventral).
In our experiment, the positive relation between DMPFC activation and the factor non-
react supports the interpretation of the DMPFC activation as a functional correlate of
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cognitive, appraising processes (Etkin et al., 2011), which in the case of LTM might
illustrate an accepting and non-reactive appraisal of inner experience. The fact that the
correlations seemed mostly driven by LTM, at least for SP, might indicate a behavioral
shift in the reaction towards positive self-appraisals, which might be distinctive for medi-
tation practitioners.
Similar to the DMPFC, LTM showed increased activations in lateral mid- and inferior
prefrontal regions during SC and SP versus NT, with the latter surviving the group
comparison. Apart from the interpretation as a typical emotion regulation area (Ochsner
et al., 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Phillips et al., 2003), mindfulness-related inter-
pretations have been suggested for lateral prefrontal areas, such as cognitive labeling of
emotional stimuli (Hariri et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2003), focused attention and open
awareness (Manna et al., 2010), or the ability to observe thoughts and emotions in a
detached manner (Fox et al., 2014).
Taken together, differential activations in frontal regions could reflect stronger self-
awareness and focus on inner feelings, and “mindful emotion regulation” in the sense of a
non-reactive attitude towards these experiences in LTM.
Differential functional connectivity during SP and SC between groups
We found positive functional coupling between the DMPFC and regions in the precuneus
and occipito-parietal lobe for self-relevant emotional conditions compared to neutral words
in MNP. Functional coupling in these regions was also significantly stronger in MNP
compared to LTM. In LTM, emotional self-related stimuli did not result in differential
functional connectivity between the DMPFC and other regions.
The precuneus is part of the default mode network and has been implicated in general
autobiographical memory retrieval and self-processing (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006;
Northoff et al., 2006), while the adjacent occipito-parietal areas are relevant for visual
attention (Pessoa et al., 2002). The stronger, positive functional coupling between midline
regions in MNP might reflect stronger self-focus or attentional processing when facing
emotional self-referential words compared to neutral words, while attention and/or self-
focus seemed less influenced by stimulus type in LTM. A similar interpretation, namely
reduced self-focused attention in meditators, was put forward by Garrison et al. (2014),
who found reduced functional connectivity in the precuneus/PCC in meditators during
loving kindness meditation. However, these interpretations remain tentative and should
ideally be corroborated with behavioral measures on the degree of self-focused processing.
Limitations and future directions Our interpretations of brain activations in
meditators remain speculative, as our findings are only partially in line with previous
studies in meditators and the interpretations draw from assumptions based on traditional
claims that meditators approach emotional self-appraisals in “healthier” ways. At the same
time, our cross-sectional design, can not exclude that meditators are drawn to practices
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like meditation because they are more interested or in need of developing skills to deal
with emotions. Similarly, they might differ in other relevant personality or life-style factors
from MNP. Further, as mentioned earlier, we can not exclude demand characteristics.
Even though we feel it is important to study concepts of self-praise and self-criticism in
experienced meditators, our results should be verified in longitudinal designs, especially
as we found no significant association between the amount of meditation training and
activation in the DMPFC. Regarding our samples, both groups were healthy and rather
high-functioning in terms of intelligence, highest degree and occupation. It will therefore
be important to expand upon our results by conducting similar experiments in more
diverse and clinical samples.
With introducing the self-praise condition, we probably lost the ability to study harsh
self-criticism, as we did not observe stable amygdala activation during self-criticism. At
the same time we found the biggest activations and group differences during SP. Thus
we gained new insights into possible links between positive affect and mindfulness - a
relationship we are only beginning to study and which needs further research. Such
research should incorporate concepts of positive psychology such as resilience, positive
outlook on life, and well-being, to fully grasp the potential of mindfulness training in the
clinical setting.
We observed differences in an active self-referential task. Still, group differences might be
associated with underlying difference in the resting state. Future studies should ideally
combine self-referential and resting state analysis to shed light on the relation between
these two modes of self-processing.
Lastly, with our design we can not fully disentangle emotional from self-referential as-
pects, since the neutral stimuli differed from self-criticism and self-praise in valence as
well as in self-reference. From a theoretical perspective, it would be difficult to fully
disentangle these two dimensions: On the one hand descriptions of aspect of the self
are in most cases emotionally colored. On the other hand emotional stimuli per def-
inition are salient to the individual and involve self-related processes. Future studies
might employ factorial designs to try and disentangle the influence of these two dimensions.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Main findings
This thesis started out by asking how mindfulness training influences habitual ways
of self-related processing. To answer this question, two studies compared mid-to-long-
term mindfulness meditators (LTM) with matched meditation-naïve participants (MNP)
regarding different aspects of self-related processes using functional magnetic imaging
(fMRI).
The first study investigated short periods of mindful self-awareness (FEEL), and compared
them to periods of cognitive self-reference (THINK). Increased activation in somatosensory
regions associated with body awareness and decreased activation in cognitive self-referential
cortical mid-line structures (CMS) were hypothesized, particularly in LTM.
During FEEL versus THINK, both groups displayed increased activations in somatosensory
regions and decreased activations in frontal and posterior CMS. Decreases were significantly
larger in LTM regarding the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), and LTM showed
reduced activations in the left inferior-lateral prefrontal cortex. Further, only LTM showed
increased activation in the bilateral insula and reductions in the amygdala. However,
there was no significant group difference regarding these regions. MNP reported higher
verbalizing of their experience during the FEEL condition compared to LTM.
In the second study we investigated behavioral and neural correlates of individualized
self-praising (SP) and self-critical (SC) stimuli (compared to neutral stimuli). Less
extreme affective ratings in LTM and lower activations in emotion-generative structures
were hypothesized. Further, differences in top-down and self-referential structures were
explored, also regarding their functional connectivity with other regions.
When comparing affective ratings after SP and SC, LTM showed a smaller difference
between these conditions compared to MNP. On the neural level, group comparisons
revealed stronger activations in emotion-generative regions in LTM during self-appraisals
compared to neutral stimuli. LTM further displayed stronger DMPFC activations. Both
differences were particularly prominent during SP. Activation in the DMPFC correlated
with a non-reacting attitude towards inner experience, as assessed by the Five Facets
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ). Further, the DMPFC activation in LTM showed
no difference in functional connectivity to other regions when comparing self-appraisals
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with neutral stimuli. The same analysis in MNP revealed increased connectivity between
DMPFC and posterior CMS and parietal regions.
6.2 Integration
Mindful self-awareness, as studied in the first experiment, is not only related to the
experiential self (Gallagher, 2000), but is also similar to a mode of self-awareness, which
is trained in mindfulness meditation. This mode is characterized by an intentional focus
on momentary experiences such as body sensations or feelings. Accordingly, Hölzel et al.
(2011)’s framework proposed an increase in body awareness in meditators, related to
activations in somatosensory areas. In our study, when comparing FEEL to THINK,
increased bilateral somatosensory activations were found in both groups. The extent
of these activations seemed larger in LTM, but the direct group comparison showed
no significant difference. These findings strengthen the notion that attention to body
sensation and feelings is a capability that is already present in untrained individuals, as
demonstrated in previous studies (Bauer et al., 2014; Herwig et al., 2010), but might
develop further with training.
Another proposed effect of meditation is a change in the perspective on the self (Hölzel
et al., 2011). For example, it has been argued that increased awareness on present-
moment sensations and feelings reduces cognitive self-reference and rumination (Farb
et al., 2013; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). This shift is probably related to functional
changes in prefrontal and posterior CMS (Brewer et al., 2011; Farb et al., 2007). In
our experiment, both groups displayed decreased activations in prefrontal and posterior
CMS during mindful self-awareness. However, decreases in the prefrontal CMS were
significantly stronger in LTM, indicating that this group reduced cognitive self-reference
stronger than MNP. The difference was in the DMPFC rather than more anterior CMS,
consistent with the group differences reported by Farb et al. (2007). The DMPFC has
been associated with evaluative functions (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). This could
mean that meditation-naïve participants had a higher tendency to evaluate self-related
phenomena compared to meditators.
Further, LTM showed reduced activation in the left inferior-lateral prefrontal cortex
including the language and inner-speech related Brocca’s area (Morin and Michaud, 2007),
which was significantly different from MNP. As such, LTM probably relied less on verbal
labeling of experience during FEEL, while it might have been a strategy in untrained
individuals to remain with momentary experiences (Lieberman et al., 2007; Torrisi et al.,
2013). This interpretation is in line with higher reported verbalizing during FEEL in MNP
(as assessed in a structured interview after the scan). It is surprising that no deactivation
in the inferior-lateral prefrontal cortex was observed in meditators by Farb et al. (2007).
Farb et al. (2007)’s study was similar to our paradigm, but used trait adjectives. The
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lack of language related stimuli in our paradigm might have been particularly suited to
detect differences between groups regarding spontaneous labeling of experience during
mindful awareness.
Finally, we found decreased amygdala activations during FEEL versus THINK in LTM
only, but groups did not differ significantly in this area. Amygdala decrease during
mindful awareness has been reported for meditation-naïve participants by Herwig et al.
(2010), but only for meditators by Farb et al. (2007). Our results provide some evidence
that LTM showed decreased emotional reactivity to sensations and feelings. The lack
of a group difference could mean that at least in this experiment on different modes of
self-processing without emotional stimuli, other factors might influence amygdala results,
such as the nature of the control task.
Decreased emotional reactivity in LTM was however explicitly hypothesized in our second
study on self-appraisals, more explicitly towards self-criticism (SC) and self-praise (SP).
LTM showed less extreme affective ratings after these blocks compared to MNP, which
was in line with this hypothesis. On the neural level though, LTM showed stronger
activations in emotion-generative structures during self-appraisals, particularly during SP.
This result stands in contrast to the hypothesis of decreased emotion related activations
during meditation (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). However, a study by Taylor et al.
(2011) reported no reduction in the amygdala during negative emotional pictures and
an increase during positive pictures in meditators. The fact that positive self-appraisals
show the biggest group differences is remarkable. Meditation training should decrease the
seeking for and attachment to positive emotions and might even reduce SP-associated
positive affect (Lalot et al., 2014). On the other hand, mindfulness has been related to
increased positive emotions and self-esteem. To address this apparent discrepancy, we
note that the instruction in our experiment to process SP and their meaning, is probably
less related to actively seeking self-praise, but to openly perceiving their emotional valence
and meaning. And LTM might have processed these emotions more strongly without
trying to change them (Chambers et al., 2009). Another explanation could be that our
findings reflect a slightly westernized form of mindfulness, where happiness, wellbeing
and self-enhancement might constitute additional goals besides weakening self-attachment
(Hollis-Walker and Colosimo, 2011).
Regarding the DMPFC, most studies suggest decreases in this region in meditators
corresponding to decreased cognitive self-processing (Brewer et al., 2011; Farb et al., 2007)
or decreased evaluation of emotions (Grant et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2011). However,
some mindfulness-related studies have reported increases in this region. Hölzel et al.
(2007) reported higher activation in meditators during focused attention on the breath
and interpreted it as increased emotional processing. Emotion regulation studies in
meditation-naïve subjects found that higher DMPFC activation was associated with
higher trait mindfulness and successful reappraisal (Modinos et al., 2010; Lutz et al.,
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2014). Our paradigm contained aspects of emotion processing and self-reference, and in
the above studies the DMPFC has been associated with both processes. This complicates
reaching a conclusion about the activation in our experiment, especially since we know of
no pertinent fMRI research into self-related emotions in meditators. A possible indication
provides the correlation between DMPFC activation and the non-reacting facet of the
FFMQ. It suggests that mindfulness meditators might have employed a form of “mindful
reappraisal”, in the sense that they would process SC and SP more strongly without
trying to react to them or change them. It is however possible that meditators with even
more expertise would show decreased CMS activations comparable to previous findings
(Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Grant et al., 2011), indicative of reduced reappraisal of
any form.
Interpretations of the differences in functional connectivity between the DMPFC and other
brain regions, when comparing self-appraisals with neutral words, must remain similarly
tentative. The positive functional coupling between mid-line regions in MNP could reflect
stronger self-focus or attentional processing of SC and SP while LTM showed no such
differential coupling related to self-appraisals. In fact, reduced functional connectivity
in the posterior CMS has been reported in meditators during loving kindness, and was
interpreted reduced self-focused attention by Garrison et al. (2014).
The results of the two presented studies complement the current knowledge on self-related
processes in several interesting ways. For the first time, different self-related processes
were studied in the same sample of meditators, thereby opening the possibility to draw
overarching conclusions on changes in the self, related to mindfulness training. Further,
we presented the first study, which used individualized self-critical and self-praising stimuli
in mindfulness meditators, who aspire a balanced attitude towards such stimuli. This type
of study has important clinical health indications as extreme self-focus and self-related
emotions (e.g. self-criticism) can lead to mental health related disorders like depression.
The alteration from significantly decreased DMPFC activations during mindful self-
awareness to significantly increased activations during self-appraisal, challenges the notion
of consistently reduced CMS activations in LTM compared to MNP. In particular, the
increased DMPFC activations during self-appraisals could reflect that LTM were more
ready and open to attentively process these emotional stimuli.
From the clinical perspective, the first study corroborated previous notions of a quieting
of cognitive self-reference during mindful awareness, which seemed fostered in mindfulness
meditators. The second study indicated a more balanced emotional experience during
self-appraisals based on affective ratings. And activations in the DMPFC and emotion-
related structures could present a mindful emotion regulation strategy during SC and SP
in this group.
Overall, states of mindful self-awareness appeared more accessible for untrained indi-
viduals, while a more balanced relation towards self-appraisals might require more training.
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6.3 Limitations
The cross-sectional design of the studies limits the conclusions we can draw from our
results with respect to meditation training in general. As Davidson (2010) and others point
out, long-term training in meditation might only be undertaken by a particular group of
individuals who already had different interests and characteristics and ultimately different
brains before they started meditation training. Typically, cross-sectional studies attempt
to overcome these limitations by correlating the amount of meditation experience with
the extent of the observed changes (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). However, in this work
we found no such association. We believe that the very diverse mindfulness experience
in our sample of meditators prevented us from detecting developmental trajectories of
mindfulness practice (Christopher et al., 2012). Nevertheless, our results provide an
important first step on the way to uncovering possible changes in self-related processes as
a result of mindfulness training.
Another caveat is that pertinent research is scarce and some of our interpretations are built
on traditional assumptions that mindfulness training leads to healthier minds. However,
we lack behavioral measures, for example about the extent of self-focus or attachment
to the self, to corroborate these interpretations. Thus, it remains crucial to verify these
traditional assumptions in future meditation studies.
6.4 Outlook
The studies presented in this thesis are first steps towards a better understanding of
mindfulness-related changes in self-functions and their neural underpinnings. Future steps
should corroborate and extend these findings in additional studies on meditators, and in
studies on clinical populations who follow mindfulness-based therapies.
Ideally, efforts should combine cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches, and comple-
ment neuroscientific data with relevant behavioral measures, such as affective ratings
applied here. Longitudinal investigations of meditation-training induced habitual changes
pose many practical difficulties, as these changes occur over longer time-scales. Cross-
sectional studies should therefore remain a valuable means to provide insights into altered
self-related processes and emotion regulation in meditators. Given the relevance of such
changes for meditation practitioners and therapeutical applications, it is surprising how
little mindfulness studies try to assess changes beyond the meditative state. Thus, more
cross-sectional studies should look into habitual changes in meditators and employ simi-
larly naturalistic designs as utilized here, to maximize the conclusions we can draw for
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every-day mental health related functions. Finally, such studies should also try to measure
behavioral correlates of these processes, for example the extent of self-focus, to build a
solid ground for interpreting neuroscientific findings.
Another interesting avenue would be to study certain sub-components of mindfulness
independently. For example, we could try to specify how body awareness alone is related
to emotion regulation on the neural level, and then identify whether, and how, mind-
fulness training transcends these effects. A possible way to accomplish this is to study
professionals (e.g. dancers) who require body awareness and attention on the body and
compare them to meditators and matched control groups (compare Sze et al., 2010).
The growing integration of mobile technology into our daily lives could partially mit-
igate the discussed problems involved with longitudinal studies on expert meditators.
Online-dairies could track meditation training, and some behavioral experiments could be
administered online. For a subset of participants additional neuroscientific measures could
be acquired (see Heller et al., 2015 for a similar approach). Such studies would permit to
compare larger samples regarding factors such as different training protocols, personality,
or cultural background, and synthesize how these relate to changes in self-processing and
emotion regulation.
To learn more about the therapeutical potential of mindfulness training for healthier
self-related processes, longitudinal studies are essential. In this context, it will be impor-
tant to disentangle specific mindfulness-related effects from unspecific factors. For such
inferences, active control groups are needed (see for example Rosenkranz et al., 2013).
Longitudinal studies in large clinical samples further hold the promise of identifying neural
or behavioral predictors regarding treatment success. This could be used, for instance, to
identify which form of mindfulness practice is most suited and approachable for a given
patient (Simon and Engström, 2015). In view of the many different forms of mindfulness
training and potentially relevant personal, cultural and biological factors which could
influence training success, we need large samples to establish such links. To this end, we
could again envision mobile applications to acquire data from participants in mindfulness
programs and measure neural correlates in a subset of participants.
Even though we found limited differences in affective ratings between our groups, further
attempts should also be made to bridging the gap between objective data and subjec-
tive experience (Cacioppo and Decety, 2011). Thus, future work should integrate the
subjective experience during meditation training, during experimental manipulations
and in everyday situations, for example in the form of “experience samples”. Integrating
subjective reports can advance our understanding of this introspective practice per se,
as illustrated in a study by Hasenkamp et al. (2012). In addition, subjects’ experiences
during meditation and their perception of meditation might influence their perseverance
and “training success”.
62
6.5. CONCLUSION
6.5 Conclusion
This thesis presented results from two fMRI studies on habitual self-related processes in
experienced mindfulness meditators. We found a central role for prefrontal mid-line regions
in this group. Their activation was reduced during experiential self-awareness compared
to self-reference, reminiscent of a quieting of self-related thinking and evaluation. When
presented with self-criticism and self-praise, however, the activation in this region was
increased. This higher activation during self-appraisals might reflect a mindful attitude to
face such stimuli in an accepting and non-reactive way. The findings and their discussion
expand on current knowledge of possible mechanisms through which mindfulness training
could influence self-related functions, and ultimately mental health.
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Figure A.1: Violinplot (box plot combined with kernel density plot) depicting me-
dian and distribution of meditators’ meditation and mindfulness-related experience.
Other mindfulness-related include Qi-Gong, Tai Chi, Kung Fu.
Table A.1:
Description of meditators’ meditation and mindfulness-related experience (life-time
hours, incl. retreats) (n = 22)
Variable M SD min max
Vipassana Meditation 4861.50 4999.74 281 18325
All Meditation (Vipassana, other Meditation) 5970.91 5505.93 506 18805
All Meditation, Yoga 6759.82 5442.43 506 18533
All Meditation, Yoga, other Mindfulness-related 7011.25 5337.95 558 18805
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Figure A.2: Violinplot (box plot combined with kernel density plot) depicting
median and distribution of current meditation and mindfulness practice. Other
mindfulness-related include Qi-Gong, Tai Chi, Kung Fu.
Table A.2: Description of meditators’ current meditation and mindfulness-related
practice (hours/week) (n = 22)
Variable M SD min max
Vipassana Meditation 5.28 2.75 1 10.5
All Meditation (Vipassana, other Meditation) 5.90 2.97 1 12.0
All Meditation, Yoga 7.05 3.50 1 14.0
All Meditation, Yoga, other Mindfulness-related 7.75 3.94 2 16.0
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Table A.3: Description of meditation-naïve participants’ mindfulness-related expe-
rience (n = 19)
n
No experience at all 12
No experience, indicate theoretical knowledge 1
Past experience meditation and mindfulness-related 4
Tai Chi: 6 hrs, 5 yrs ago.
Tai Chi, irregular, more than 20 years ago.
Zen 8 hrs and Yoga 3 hrs, 1 year ago.
Yoga experience, marginal, irregular, not at the moment.
Irregular current practice mindfulness-related 2
Yoga/relaxation techniques, irregular, gives shiatsu therapy.
Qi Gong, rarely, infrequent, since 1 year, self-guided.
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Matching and group characteristics
Table A.4: Matching variables between groups
MNP (n = 22) LTM (n = 22)
M SD M SD Statistic df p
Age 45.45 10.94 47 11.11 t(42) =-.46 .64
Gender (f/m) 10/12 8/14 χ2(1) = .094 .76
Education (years) 18.36 3.69 19.05 4.50 t(42) =-.55 .59
IQ (MWT-B) 122.59 13.45 118.18 13.19 t(42) = 1.10 .28
Abbreviations MWT-B Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test
Table A.5: Occupation per group
MNP(n = 22) LTM (n = 22)
Field # working in this field # working in this field
Retired 0 1
Student (psychology) 2 1
Business 7 5
Sciences 2 1
Humanities 2 2
Arts 1 1
Health care 2 3
Mental health care 4 6
Spiritual 1 3
Note. Groups did not differ in their general fields of occupation:
χ2(8, n = 44) = 4.6, p = .79.
Business: self-employed, employee, management, business coaches.
Sciences: ingnenieering, informatics, research.
Humanities: philosopher, teacher, translator, historian.
Health care: medical doctors, animal doctors, and caregivers outside psychiatry.
Mental health: psychologist, psychiatrist, caregivers in psychiatry, shiatsu-therapist.
Spiritual: 3 mindfulness-teachers (1 full-, 3 part-time), 1 yoga-teacher, 1 deacon.
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Questionnaire results
Table A.6: Mindfulness questionnaire group results and comparisons
MNP (n = 22) LTM (n = 22)
M SD M SD Statistic (df) p p(fdr)
FFMQ
Observe 28.00 5.91 31.45 3.38 t(42) =-2.38 .02∗ .15
Describe 30.73 6.23 32.14 3.77 t(42) =-.91 .37 .49
Awareness 31.55 6.15 31.55 4.89 t(42) = 0.00 1.00 1.00
Non-judge 33.45 5.47 33.59 5.42 t(42) =-.08 .93 1.00
Non-react 23.32 4.49 27.36 3.61 t(42) =-3.30 .002∗∗ .027∗
SCS
Self-kindness 3.28 1.08 3.81 1.11 t(42) =-1.60 .12 .30
Self-judgement 2.50 1.10 2.08 .80 t(42) = 1.44 .16 .34
Common humanity 3.05 1.03 3.28 .97 t(42) =-.79 .43 .51
Isolation 2.03 .89 .77 .77 t(42) = 1.36 .18 .34
Mindfulness 3.43 .89 1.69 .97 t(42) =-.89 .38 .49
Overidentified 2.43 .95 2.11 .71 t(42) = 1.26 .21 .35
Total 3.46 .79 3.82 .53 t(42) =-1.77 .08 . .28
TAS
Total 39.68 10.38 35.14 6.11 t(42) = 1.74 .09. .29
Abbreviations. FFMQ Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, SCS Self-Compassion Scale
Note. A total score for the FFMQ is not usually reported.
p(fdr) corrected for 13 tests
emphSignificance levels .p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01
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Pre-/Post-scanning questionnaires
Table A.7: PANAS, tiredness and general experience during scanning
MNP (n = 22) LTM (n = 22)
M SD M SD Statistic df p
Pre-Scan
Positive affect 30.55a 6.32 32.74b 6.05 t(37) =-1.10 .28
Negative affect 13.10a 3.51 13.11b 2.05 t(37) =-.01 1.00
Post-Scan
Tiredness 3.95 2.01 2.86 1.61 t(42) = 1.98 .054
Experience in scanner 6.05 1.76 6.29c 1.85 t(41) =-.44 .66
Pain .23 .43 .38 .50c χ2(1) = 0.58 .44
Abbreviations PANAS Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
Note. Tiredness and experience in the scanner where measured on a 9-point self-report Likert scale
Tiredness: 1=not at all tired, 9=very tired, Experience in the scanner: 1=very uncomfortable, 9=very
comfortable
Pain was asked dichotomously: 0=no pain, 1=yes
a n = 20.
b n = 19.
c n = 21.
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Pre-/Post-scanning questionnaires
Table B.1: Task related self-report measures
MNP (n = 19) LTM (n = 21)
M SD M SD Statistic df p
Post-Scan
FEEL in 6.79b 1.55 7.25c 1.21 t(37) =-1.03 .31
FEEL out 7.00 1.29b 7.15 1.35c t(37) =-0.35 .72
FEEL succ 6.47b 1.61 7.10c 1.55 t(37) =-1.24 .22
FEEL verbal 5.63b 1.42 6.70c 1.53b t(37) =-2.26 .030∗
THINK in 7.11a 1.41 7.37b 1.30 t(37) =-.58 .57
THINK out 7.11a 1.57 7.16b 1.38 t(37) =-.096 .92
THINK succ 7.11 1.37 7.45 1.36c t(37) =-.79 .43
Abbreviations succ success
Note. FEEL/THINK in/out, success, verbal measured on a 9-point discrete Likert scale
In/out: How easy was it to get in/out of the condition: 1=very difficult, 9=very easy.
In/out: 1=not tired, 9=very tired
Experience in the scanner: 1=very uncomfortable, 9=very comfortable.
Success: How well could you follow the instructions: 1=not at all, 9=very good.
verbal: How verbal were your experiences during FEEL.
E.g. Did you label your experiences (9=only verbal) or not (1=only perceptual).
a n = 18.
b n = 19.
c n = 20.
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Previous studies
Table B.2: Overview previous findings
Region	   Study:	  Herwig,	  2010	   Study:	  Farb,	  2007	   Study:	  Farb,	  2007	  
Sample:	  Naïve	   Sample:	  Naïve	   Sample:	  a<er	  MBSR	  
Amygdala	   Amygdala/Hippocampus	  L	   No	  result	  reported	   Amygdala	  L	  
	  	   	   	   	  
Mid-­‐prefrontal	   MPFC	  (and	  ACC)	  R	  (6)	   No	  result	  reported	   No	  result	  reported	  
	  	   Mid	  anterior	  prefrontal	  (9)	   Rostral	  MPFC	  (10)	   Dorsal	  MPFC	  (9,	  10,	  32)	  
	  	   	   	   	  
Other	  Midline	   PCC	  (23,	  31)	   PCC	  (23,	  31)	   No	  result	  reported	  
	  	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	  
Prefrontal	  lateral	   DLPFC	  L	  (6/8/9)	   DLPFC	  L	  	  (46/9)	   No	  result	  reported	  
	  	   Inferior	  frontal	  L	  (44)	   Ventrolateral	  prefrontal	  L	  (47)	   Dorsal	  inferolateral	  R	  (46,	  45)	  
	  	   	   	   	  
Somatosensory	   Somatosensory	  cortex	  R	  (3/7/40)	   No	  result	  reported	   Supramarginal	  gyrus	  R	  (40)	  
	  	   	   	   	  
Insula	   Inferior	  frontal/Insula	  post	  R	  (43/6/13)	   No	  result	  reported	   Insula	  post	  R	  
	  	   	   	   	  
Parietal	   Bi-­‐lateral	   Le<-­‐sided	   No	  result	  reported	  
Activations (red) and reduced activations (blue) during FEEL>THINK (Herwig et al., 2010) in meditation-
naive participants, and during experiential versus narrative self-reference (Farb et al., 2007) in meditation-naive
participants and participants after an MBSR course. Independent exploratory ROI analysis were conducted for
regions printed in bold. Brodman areas are indicated in brackets.
ROI analysis
Figure B.1: Independent ROIs. Colors represent reported reduced activations
(blue) and activations in meditation-naive (red) and in mindfulness trained (yellow)
participants in the studies by Herwig et al. (2010) and Farb et al. (2007). Since the
amygdala overlapped between the studies, we averaged x, y, and z coordinates to
create an averaged ROI. TAL to MNI conversion were obtained using the Lancaster
transform implemented in GingerALE (Laird et al., 2010).
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Table B.3: Independent ROI results
MNP LTM MNP >LTM
Region Study x, y, z Mean (SD) t (df = 18) Mean (SD) t (df = 20) t (df = 38)
Amygdala L Avg −25,−8, 14 −0.029(0.11) −1.16 −0.048(0.10) −2.29 0.58
DLPFC L Farb −36, 32, 24 −0.027(0.15) −0.85 −0.028(0.15) −0.84 −0.019
Herwig −32, 18, 46 0.000(0.13) −0.02 −0.13(0.13) −4.60 3.20
SII R Farb 40,−40, 20 0.016(0.067) 1.03 0.0048(0.061) 0.36 0.54
Herwig 59,−30, 30 0.26(0.034) 3.39 0.22(0.23) 4.42 0.42
Insula post R Farb 40,−8, 16 0.011(0.13) 0.39 −0.022(0.12) −0.84 0.85
Herwig 55, 0, 1 0.093(0.19) 2.08 0.14(0.18) 3.64 −0.80
Abbreviations Avg average, DLPFC dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, SII secondary somatosensory cortex, LTM
mid-to-long-term meditators, MNP meditation-naive participants, R right, L left, M medial
Stereotaxic coordinates are based on the human atlas of MNI, BA are based on Talairach Daemon labels in FSL
view.
Additional fMRI material
FEEL >B
Figure B.2: Neural activations (red) and deactivations (blue) of FEEL>THINK.
Probability maps depict significant results for meditators (LTM), meditation-naive
participants (MNP) (light colors) and the group comparison MNP>LTM (dark
colors).
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Supplementary material study 2
Stimulus selection and evaluation
Table C.1: Individually chosen self-critical and self-praising adjectives and individual
evaluation
MNP (n = 22) LTM (n = 22)
M SD M SD Statistic df p
SC
Number chosen 7.55 2.26 7.95 2.48 t(42) = −.57 .57
Evaluation per adjective 2.81 .84 2.97 .61
NNSC
Evaluation per adjective 3.78 .56 3.67 .67
SP
Number chosen 11.36 5.32 13.18 5.57 t(42) = −1.11 .27
Evaluation per adjective 4.30 .48 4.42 .49
Abbreviations SC self-criticism, NNSC negative not self-critical, SP self-praise
Note. Number indicates the number of chosen adjectives
from the lists of 52 positive and 52 negative adjectives
The 6 selected adjectives had to be rated on a 5 point Likert-scale
For SC “how negative do you judge these traits?”, For NNSC “how negative do you judge these traits?”
Response-scale SC and NNSC: 1=not negative, 2=slightly negative, 3=rather negative, 4=quite negative, 5=very
negative
For SP “how positive do you judge these traits?”
Response-scale for SP: 1=not positive, 2=slightly positive, 3=rather positive, 4=quite positive, 5=very positive
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Affective rating
Figure C.1: The figure shows absolute mood ratings after each condition for both
groups. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval. Values were first aggregated
on the subject level. NNSC negative not self-critical, NT neutral, SC self-criticism,
SP self-praise.
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Additional fMRI results
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Figure C.2: Mask from the conjunction analysis, displayed on the MNI brain and
mean % signal change from this region during single conditions and contrasts
of interest for both groups. Statistics are not independent from mask selection.
Therefore they are solely meant to illustrate the activations underlying the contrasts
and group differences.
PPI schematic representation
Seed
(DMPFC)Seed
Seed
(DMPFC)
Target Target
LTMMNP
Figure C.3: Schematic representation of significant PPI effects (correlations between
MPFC Seed and Target regions during Emo and Neutral conditions) in both
groups (MNP and LTM) underlying the significant group difference in functional
connectivity. Direct correlations between these regions were not computed, because
results would not be independent and effects overestimated.
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